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This dissertation examines the determinants of the effect of partisanship on
support for a parliamentary government. In doing so, I address a set of related
questions, using Japan as an example. I begin with a descriptive question: Is
the effect of partisanship on the job approval of the administration changing
over time? To answer this question, using the 1960 - 2001 time series data, I
demonstrate the changing impact of the job approval rate of the cabinets over
this period.
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Then I turn to explanations for the change and ask: Why does the effect
change over time? I hypothesize that supporters of newly established parties
in the government are less likely to be influenced by their partisanship when
evaluating the cabinet’ performance. Partisanship, defined here as a predispo-
sition to support a particular political party, grows with the cumulative effect
of political experience and learning. There is, however, less opportunity for
newly established political parties to have such loyal supporters.
My second hypothesis holds that supporters of ruling parties to which
the prime minister does not belong are less likely to make partisan judgments
in appraising the cabinet’s performance. Party identification extends to the
government in which the party participates, the partisan effect on the appraisal
of the government’s performance emerges. The party affiliation of the prime
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The popularity of a government among citizens is obviously one of the most
important political variables in democratic societies. As popularity declines,
a government loses its legitimacy and finally becomes a “lame duck,” or even
dissolved, if in a parliamentary system. While the economy is crucial for a
government’s survival, public support for ruling political parties is also helpful
for the government to keep its popularity. Republicans are, for example, the
most loyal block of voters that the Bush administration has.
As the economy naturally fluctuates, and as there is no guarantee that
politicians can always manipulate the economy for their purposes, voters who
are emotionally attached to government parties play an important role in
bringing stability to the government’s job approval rate. The impact of parti-
sanship on the evaluation of the government’s performance, however, may not
be constant over time, especially when the number of partisan voters declines,
as in most industrialized societies.
This dissertation examines the determinants of the partisan effect on
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support for a parliamentary government. In doing so, I address a set of related
questions, using Japan as an example. I begin with a descriptive question: Is
the effect of partisanship on the government’s job approval changing over time?
To answer this question, I demonstrate the changing impact of the job approval
rate of the cabinets over this period using the 1960 - 2001 time series data.
Then I turn to explanations for the change and ask: Why does the effect
change over time? I hypothesize that supporters of newly established parties
in the government are less likely to be influenced by their partisanship when
evaluating the performance of the cabinet. Partisanship, defined here as a pre-
disposition to support a particular political party, grows with the cumulative
effect of political experience and learning. There is, however, less opportunity
for newly established political parties to have such loyal supporters. This hy-
pothesis is proposed as an empirical implication of a theoretical model, and
tested in an EITM (Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models) framework.
My second hypothesis holds that supporters of ruling parties to which
the prime minister does not belong are less likely to make partisan judgments in
appraising the cabinet’s performance. Party identification, defined here as an
affective attachment to a particular party, extends to the government in which
the party participates, the partisan effect on appraisals of the government’s
performance emerges. The party affiliation of the prime minister influences to
what extent people will associate a government with the party.
An understanding of the dynamics of the partisan effect on popularity of
a government will increase our knowledge regarding the nature of what makes
2
Japanese government legitimate. It will also contribute to the field of political
behavior by suggesting possible sources of the partisan effect.
1.1 Research Questions
The theoretical focus of this dissertation is on the determinants of the partisan
effect on government support. The job approval rate significantly determines
the fate of the administration in democratic polities. In parliamentary systems,
popularity influences cabinet duration (Martin 2000; Masuyama 2001, 2002),1
while in presidential systems, it affects a president’s legislative success (Ostrom
and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985; Brace and Hincley 1992; Canes-Wrone
and de Marchi 2002) and reelection (Rice 1984; Abramowitz 1988; Holbrook
2001).
Government popularity among citizens can be explained by several
factors, such as economic conditions (Pissarides 1980; Frey and Schneider
1980; Inoguchi 1980; Norpoth and Yantek 1983; MacKuen 1983; Norpoth
1987; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992; Nadeau et al. 1999), political
events (MacKuen 1983; Norpoth 1987), and partisanship of voters (Frey and
Schneider 1980; Inoguchi 1980; Hibbs, Rivers and Vasilatos 1982; Bond and
Fleisher 2001). Since economic conditions are the most influential variables,
administrations have an incentive to manipulate the economy (Nordhaus 1975;
MacRae 1977; Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1987; Rogoff and Subert 1988; Alesina 1992;
1Although numerous researchers have attempted to explain cabinet duration in par-
liamentary systems (e.g. King et al. (1990) and Warwick and Easton (1992)), there are
surprisingly few studies focusing on the effect of cabinet popularity on its duration.
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Kohno and Nishizawa 1990) and the electorate’s perceptions of the economy
(Hetherington 1996), but these attempts do not necessarily work consistently,
and popularity fluctuates with economic conditions, which are always chang-
ing.
Partisanship or party identification, on the other hand, can provide a
more reliable base for government popularity. Partisanship is a stable psycho-
logical attachment to a political party, and plays a prominent role in shaping
attitudes toward political objects (Campbell et al. 1960; Lodge and Hamill
1986; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991). “Revisionists” have challenged
the traditional Michigan framework, in which party identification is the most
fundamental variable in explaining other political attitudes (Campbell et al.
1960). Some emphasize reciprocal effects of specific political attitudes on party
identification (Jackson 1975; Page and Jones 1979; Franklin and Jackson 1983)
while others describe party identification as “a running tally of retrospective
evaluations of party promises and performance” (Fiorina 1981, p.86). It is still
evident, however, that partisan loyalties have pervasive effects on perceptions
of the political world (Bartels 2002).
This implies that the electorate’s enduring psychological predisposition
from which the partisan effect on other political attitudes emerges is inde-
pendent of any rational evaluation of the economy. In this sense, partisan
loyalty is uniquely important in forming people’s attitudes toward a govern-
ment, helping the government enjoy stable popularity even in an economic
depression.
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Although the functional benefits of partisanship have been well-discussed,
there are few empirical analyses of the roots of its effect. At best, scholars have
studied who relies on party cues more heavily than others in political decision
making (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Bul-
lock 2006). Such studies provide valuable clues, but are static and descriptive
in nature, leaving a question of why the partisan effect increases or decreases.
Scholars have repeatedly emphasized that partisanship has substantial
influence over other political attitudes and behaviors because of its stability.
Therefore, given plenty of evidence that partisanship has been significantly
unstable both aggregately and individually in most industrialized democra-
cies (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; MacKuen,
Erikson and Stimson 1989; Clarke and Suzuki 1994; Dalton 1996; Clarke and
Stewart 1998), a dynamic change in the partisan effect can be reasonably
expected.
Despite its unique significance described above, the effect of partisan-
ship on the evaluation of a government’s performance has not been well-
examined, and is typically assumed to be constant over time (Frey and Schnei-
der 1980; Inoguchi 1980; Hibbs, Rivers and Vasilatos 1982; Bond and Fleisher
2001).
1.2 Theory and Hypotheses
In an effort to understand the determinants of the partisan effect, I derive two
basic hypotheses about the effect’s origins from the literature. Attachment
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to a political party grows with the cumulative effect of experience (Campbell
et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Lodge and Hamill 1986). This effect may be con-
sidered a “running tally” of rational evaluations (Fiorina 1981), or the product
of reference group socialization and habituation (Converse 1969; Gerber and
Green 1998), but recurring interest in the same party strengthens a sense of
partisan identity (Brader and Tucker 2001). Once voters acquire partisanship,
they tend to be loyal and patient even when sometimes facing “betrayal” by
the party. Thus, partisanship plays a unique role as a bias in political attitude
formation, distinguished from a rational evaluation.
Such a process of the development implies that the duration of a party
is a necessary condition for partisanship to grow, simply because voters need
enough time to learn about the party. Voters will have more difficulty in
forming a psychological attachment to a party that is newly established than
one that has existed for a long time, even if they like the new party’s platform
and show a supportive attitude toward it. Like independents, supporters of
the new parties have not yet obtained strong partisanship as a emotional
attachment to the party, therefore they tend to rely more heavily on rational
rather than emotional evaluations. In addition, partisanship of existing parties
can bes eroded by the establishment of new parties that provide voters with
new alternatives. Thus I expect that the partisan effect is weaker among
supporters of a new party.
Second, for partisanship to be influential in political decision making,
voters must associate a party with other political objects, such as a candidate,
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president, or government. Even if one has a strong partisan identity, he will
not appraise other political objects more positively than independent voters
unless the political objects are related (at least partially) to the party label in
his mind. For example, when he considers his party’s control of a government,
his positive emotion toward the party will help him positively evaluate the
government’s performance. Thus, I expect the partisan effect to be most
powerful when a party’s supporters have a strong sense that the party “owns”
the other political object under evaluation.
I use Japan as a case that provides a unique opportunity to test the
hypotheses. In doing so, I modify the hypotheses to fit the Japanese con-
text. Examining these hypotheses also allows us to answer one of the most
important questions in Japanese politics: How could a one-party dominant
regime endure for almost forty years in democracy?2 Such a long duration
of the LDP government would be impossible without the partisan effect on
government support.
After the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in 1955 as a
merger between Japan’s two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the
Japan Democratic Party, Japanese citizens experienced a one-party dominant
regime under the LDP government until 1993. During this period, the elec-
torate’s partisanship was the most powerful factor in explaining Japanese polit-
ical attitudes and behaviors (Miyake 1985, 1998), and the government enjoyed
popularity backed by LDP supporters who were loyal even when facing al-
2This question is explored especially by Pempel (1990) who focuses on the LDP’s strategy
to mobilize citizens.
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most habitual corruption by politicians they support(Inoguchi 1980; Nishizawa
2001).
Given this situation in Japan, I argue based on the first hypothesis that
the LDP could remain in power for such a long time because the political
environment in post-war Japan allowed citizens the opportunity to develop
strong partisanship toward the LDP, through ideological competition among
parties, and through Japan’s economic success under the LDP government.
Japan’s post-war party politics were characterized by the opposition between
two political ideologies, liberal democracy, represented by the LDP, and social-
ism, promoted by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The choice between these
parties meant a choice between regimes, implying that the LDP was the only
acceptable alternative for those who supported the liberal democratic regime.
Thus partisanship toward the LDP grew among citizens, as liberal democracy
developed in post-war Japan, while LDP support was associated with support
for the government as long as the political system was liberal democratic.
The economic growth which began in the 1960s under the LDP govern-
ment also contributed to the LDP’s one-party dominant regime by enhancing
the partisan effect on cabinet support. It allowed the LDP to attract more
voters who were not ideologically committed to any issues, and to become a
“catch-all party.” In the course of economic growth, the LDP successfully es-
tablished its reputation among voters as the only party capable of governing,
while the JSP and other opposition parties were expected by voters to play
only a minor role in checking the LDP. The reliability of the LDP as a ruling
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party helped citizens to acquire psychological attachment with the party, as
well as enhancing the tie between the LDP and the government in their mind.
The second hypothesis also helped us explain the duration of the LDP
government, suggesting that the lack of prime minister’s personality strength-
ened the relative influence of party support on cabinet support. Until the
late 1980s, Japanese TV news programs had been descriptive, neutral, or ob-
jective in the sense that newscasters, especially those of Japan’s sole public
broadcaster, NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyoukai), merely reported facts based on in-
formation released by the government (Krauss 2000). Voters had few ways to
receive information on politicians’ personalities including the prime minister’s,
and therefore rarely took this information into consideration when making po-
litical judgments. The party labels, especially that of the LDP, were much
more important than prime minister’s personality.
Moreover, Japanese prime ministers were expected to implement poli-
cies with a consensus of the party members, especially faction leaders, giving
voters an impression that a cabinet is not controlled by the prime minister,
but by the party. This circumstance made voters refer to their likability of
the party more heavily than that of the prime minister when evaluating the
cabinet’s performance. As long as the cabinet was “endorsed” by the LDP
that had loyal supporters over the course of history, it could expect consistent
public support despite a series of scandals and economic depression.
In the general election of 1993, however, the LDP lost its majority status
in the House of Representatives, and eight opposition parties including, the
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newly established Japan New Party (JNP, Nihon Shintou), Japan Renewal
Party (JRP, Shinseitou), and New Party Sakigake (Shinto Sakigake), formed a
coalition government following the election. Since then, coalition politics have
been typical in Japan. Comparing the coalition governments of the 1990s to
the LDP government may help us examine the change in the partisan effect
on government support corresponding to the change in political environment.
Based on the first hypothesis, I expect that supporters of the new par-
ties are less likely to be influenced by their partisanship when evaluating the
performance of the cabinet, even if their party participates in the government
coalition. This also implies that as the proportion of new party supporters
within a body of ruling party supporters increases, the effect of party support
on cabinet support decreases. Unlike the LDP, these new parties had no sup-
porters who were strongly attached. Given their short history, they naturally
could not have provided citizens with enough opportunity to learn about them.
Although these new parties shared liberal democratic values with the
LDP, ideology was no longer important for voters in the 1990s after the collapse
of the Soviet Union. De-ideologized voters were likely to change their party
support, or “float” between parties. Although the floating voters helped the
parties take power, there was no guarantee that they were a firm support base
as the LDP supporters had been for the LDP government. Popularity of these
parties was mainly due to their reformist attitudes. Therefore, the coalition
government could not benefit from party support in maintaining popularity if
evaluated only upon their achievement of political reform.
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Referring to the second hypothesis, I expect that the supporters of the
ruling parties to which the prime minister does not belong are less likely to
make partisan judgments in appraising the cabinet’s performance. The party
affiliation of the prime minister influences the extent to which people associate
the government with the party they support. In other words, partisanship is
more influential among supporters of the party to which the prime minister
belongs than among those of other parties.
Although the prime ministers’ personalities became more available to
voters through the TV news programs that provided stories focusing on indi-
vidual politicians after the late 1980s (Krauss 2000), the coalition governments
had raised the question of voter identification with the prime minister. There
was only one prime minister, while the coalition government consisted of mul-
tiple parties. This situation made it difficult for voters to associate their party
with the cabinet when the prime minister did not belong to the party.
1.3 Data and Methods
This dissertation examines the determinants of the effect of party support on
cabinet support in Japan, and is organized as follows. Chapter 2 overviews the
relationship between party support and cabinet support from the 1960s to the
1990s. By reviewing relevant literature on Japanese politics and examining
some statistics, I show that it is reasonable to expect a changing impact of
party support on cabinet support over time.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of government party support on cabinet
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support to provide a basis for analyses on the changing effect in later chapters.
More specifically, I investigate how cabinet support, party support, and the
economy influence each other, using a vector autoregressive (VAR) methodol-
ogy (Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989; Simms 1980) with the Granger causality
analysis and the impulse response functions.
In Chapter 4,3 I investigate the changing effect of party support on
cabinet support, conducting a time series analysis of data drawn from monthly
polls taken by Jiji Press, 1960-2001.
First, Using the idea of EITM (Empirical Implications of Theoreti-
cal Models) (Granato and Scioli 2004; National Science Foundation 2002) to
combine both formal theory and statistical analysis, I constructs a theoreti-
cal model of cabinet support, and draws an empirical implication about the
changing effect of party support on cabinet support. In the model, I show the
mechanism by which partisan loyalty is transformed into the effect of party
support on cabinet support, using the AR(1) process as an “analogue” of par-
tisan loyalty or persistence of party support. The implication is that when
the persistence of support rates for existing parties is stronger than that of
support rates for new parties, the effect of party support on cabinet support
decreases as the proportion of new party supporters who support the cabinet
within a body of all cabinet supporters increases. I illustrate this idea with
time series data drawn from the monthly polls conducted by Jiji Pres.
Second, I empirically demonstrates the changing effect of party support
3An earlier version of this chapter was written in Japanese, and published as Iida (2005).
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on cabinet support over time, using ARFIMA (autoregressive fractionally in-
tegrated moving average) modeling (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1998; Lebo,
Walker and Clarke 2000; Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlison 2000; Clarke and
Lebo 2003) as well as time varying parameter techniques such as the Legendre
polynomial model (Lin 1999) and a Bayesian change point model(Western and
Kleykamp 2004). The dependent variable is the support rate for the cabinets,
and the independent variables are the support rate for the ruling parties, the
consumer price index,4 and the “honeymoon” dummies.
The results show that the effect of party support on cabinet support de-
clined under the Hosokawa government, which was the first non-LDP coalition
government in 38 years. While this tendency remained under the Murayama
coalition government, the partisan effect returned just after Hashimoto, the
LDP leader, assumed the prime minister’s seat.
In Chapter 5,5 I test two hypotheses to explain this change in the effect
of party support on cabinet support in the 1990s, using panel data from the
Japan Election Study II (JESII) , 1993-1996.6 I propose two models, one static
and one dynamic. In the static model, the dependent variable is voters’ eval-
uation of the cabinet’s performance in general, and the independent variables
are age; education; sex; voters’ evaluations of the cabinet’s performance in po-
4CPI is available on the website of the Japanese Statistics Bureau at
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/cpi/200107/zuhyou/a002hh.xls
5An earlier version of this chapter was written in Japanese, and published as Iida (2006).
6The JES II was conducted by Ikuo Kabashima, Joji Watanuki, Ichiro Miyake, Yoshiaki
Kobayashi, and Ken’ichi Ikeda. This was a seven wave panel study, begun before the House
of Representatives election in 1993, after the House of Councilors Election in July 1995, and
before/after the House of Representatives election in 1996.
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litical and economic issues; and party support which is measured as dummies
(the reference category is “independent”). In the dynamic model, the depen-
dent variable is the change in the evaluation of the cabinet’s performance in
general between two time points, and the independent variables are the change
in evaluations of the cabinet’s performance in political and economic issues;
and the change in party support, which is measured as dummies (the reference
category is voters who remain “independent” between two time points).
The results suggest that the effect of party support on cabinet support
dropped under the Murayama administration because the supporters of the
LDP, to which the prime minister did not belong, supported the Murayama
cabinet less strongly. Although the supporters of the JSP with which the prime
minister was affiliated tended to support the cabinet, their proportion within
the body of all government party supporters was not large. The results also
imply that the effect returned under the Hashimoto administration because the
prime minister was the LDP party leader, and a large body of LDP supporters
strongly supported the cabinet.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the overall findings of this dissertation,
discusses their broader implications and generalizability to other democratic
countries, and suggests a future research agenda. It also discusses the unique




Party Support and Cabinet
Support in Japan
This chapter overviews the relationship between party support and cab-
inet support in post-war Japan. Through a review of literature, I show that
it is reasonable to expect a changing impact of party support on cabinet sup-
port over time. More specifically, I explore why Japanese voters’ supportive
attitude toward the LDP was strongly associated with support for a cabinet,
and why the LDP supporters had a reason to support the LDP government.
I, then, look at why that association became weaker.
The basic argument here is that LDP support was tightly associated
with cabinet support in Japanese people’s minds under the LDP’s one party
dominant regime, the “ so-called 1955 party system,” for two reasons, ideo-
logical origins of partisanship, and voters’ perception of the LDP’s ability to
govern. The changing political environment, such as economic development
and the resolution of the Cold War, however, altered the relationship. This
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chapter is also intended to provide a context for the statistical analysis of
Japanese data in the following chapters.
2.1 A Tie between the LDP Support and Cab-
inet Support
After World War II, Japan was rebuilt as a liberal democratic state under the
direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) established
by the United States. The liberal democracy was, however, not necessarily
the only realistic alternative in the people’s mind at that time. Communists
were admired by a number of citizens and most intellectuals for their most
principled resistance to the war.1 The Japan Socialist Party (JSP/Shakaitou),
on the other hand, won a plurality in the House of Representatives as a result of
the first general election of 1947. Its leader, Tetsu Katayama, was even elected
prime minister in a progressive coalition government, although the government
collapsed soon after because of the leftist rebellion within the party.
The United States first allowed the progressive groups to grow, aiming
at purging the militaristic and imperial legacies of pre-war Japan. When
1For example, John W. Dower emphasizes the Communists’ considerable status in Japan
during the early post-war period, stating: “When Tokuda Kyūichi and several hundred
other Communists were released from prison, they became celebrities and instant heroes
in a society whose old heroes had all suddenly been toppled. Similarly, Nosaka Sanzō’s
arrival in January 1946 after a long journey from China attracted a great crowd. He, too,
received a hero’s welcome; even conservatives, it was said, joined in. Within a few months
Nosaka was elected to the Diet in the first general election held under occupation auspices.
Defeat gave such Communist leaders charisma, imbuing them with an aura of integrity and
political acuity. By the same token, defeat helped establish Marxism and the Communist
Party itself as sources of clear, secular, universal principles that transcended the disastrous,
particularistic values of the imperial state.”(Dower 1999, p.236)
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realizing the need to confront the communist threat in East Asia, however, the
SCAP finally began to oppress the leftist movements that were opposed to the
rearmament of the country, and helped the conservative camps to create a new
military force.2 Corresponding to a change in the American occupation policy
known as “the reverse course,”3 conservatives of the Liberal party (Jiyuutou)
and the Democratic Party (Minshutou) attempted to modify the achievements
of post-war reforms including the Constitution, especially its Article 9 that
prohibited the use of military force.
As a reaction, the progressives and organized labour conducted aggres-
sive protests around the country, and the JSP was reunified. The JSP aimed
to protect the Constitution and oppose against rearmament as well as the mil-
itary alliance between the United States and Japan symbolized by the security
treaty signed in 1951 (Masumi 1983). This finally lead to a counter-reaction
from the conservative camp under the strong influence of the traditional com-
mercial and financial communities (Zaikai) as a merger of two conservative
parties into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Jiyuu Minshutou/Jimintou)
in 1955.
2The military force was founded as the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai) in
1950 when the Korean War started, then was renamed the National Safety Forces (Hoantai)
in 1952, and finally became the Self-Defence Force (Jieitai) in 1954.
3It is called “reverse,” compared to the progressive social reforms early in the Occupation.
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2.1.1 Ideological Origins of Party Support
Since then, the opposition between the LDP and the JSP had formed “The
1955 party system.4” Under the party system, political parties represented
different political ideologies or regimes. The LDP, backed by the United
States, had a realistic orientation of liberal democracy that was compatible
with Japanese traditional values, including the Emperor system while the JSP
and the JCP, influenced by the Soviet Union, aimed at establishing a socialist
regime.5 Naturally, a pattern of voters’ party support followed the ideological
cleavage in the sense that liberal democrats were likely to support the LDP,
and socialists and communists tended to favor the JSP and the JCP.
Because of the ideological roots of party support, voters’ support rarely
changed between the LDP and the JSP. Voters might stop supporting the LDP
for one reason or another, but they were unlikely to become the JSP support-
ers because of the different ideology. Kohno (2001) shows that correlations
between support rates for the LDP and the JSP are generally statistically in-
significant under the 1955 party system, as shown in Table 2.1. This suggests
4“The 1955 Party System” is the most influential and frequently used concept to explain
post-war Japanese politics. According to Yamaguchi (1985), it is most commonly charac-
terized as the ideological opposition between conservative and progressive parties over the
Constitution and “the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”
5Although the JSP and the JCP did not receive orders from the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, some of their members were under its influence. While the JSP belonged
to the anti-communist Socialist International, there was an enduring tension within the
party between the leftists who were sympathetic to communism and the idea of Marxist
revolution, and rightists who were moderate social democrats. The JCP pursued its own
direction, independent of communists abroad, but always cared about their reactions. For
example, when facing the Cominform’s criticism against the JCP’s willingness to compromise
with the SCAP, the JCP decided to start a desperate armed struggle for revolution after a
hard fight among its members in 1950(Scalapino 1967).
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that a decrease in the LDP support rate did not lead to an increase in the
JSP support rate, which indicates that the JSP was not an acceptable choice
for the liberal democrats, while the LDP was not a possible alternative for the
socialists.
On the other hand, correlations between the support rate for either
party and the proportion of independent voters are substantively negative, as
also shown in Table 2.1. This implies that a decrease in the proportion of
LDP and JSP supporters lead to an increase in the proportion of independent
voters. In other words, someone who stopped supporting the LDP or JSP was
likely to become politically independent, rather than joining opposing party.
Table 2.1 Correlations between Independent, LDP Support, and JSP Support
(Pearson Coefficient)
Period Independent - LDP Independent - JSP LDP - JSP
June 1960-May 1963 -.346∗ -.534∗∗ .024
June 1963-May 1966 -.426∗∗ -.214 -.406∗
June 1966-May 1969 -.605∗∗ -.627∗∗ .298
June 1969-May 1972 -.766∗∗ .331∗ -.447∗∗
June 1972-May 1975 -.658∗∗ -.662∗∗ .338∗
June 1975-May 1978 -.560∗∗ -.377∗ -.273
June 1978-May 1981 -.680∗∗ -.348∗ .009
June 1981-May 1984 -.649∗∗ -.542∗∗ .327
June 1984-May 1987 -.462∗∗ -.300 -.325
June 1987-May 1990 -.356∗ -.511∗∗ -.466∗∗
June 1990-May 1993 -.732∗∗ -.053 -.347
** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05; two tailed test.
Source: Kohno (2001), Table 2-3
Data: Monthly support rates for the LDP and JSP, and the proportion of
independent voters, 1960-1993, drawn from monthly polls of the Jiji press.
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Under the 1955 party system, the ideological opposition between polit-
ical parties was obvious to most citizens. A number of surveys show that
Japanese citizens did not have much difficulty placing political parties on
the ideological spectrum from “conservative” to “progressive.” According to
Miyake (1985), 87 percent of voters placed political parties on a left-right ide-
ology scale in the same order, as part of the Japanese National Election Survey
of 1967 conducted by the University of Michigan. Miyake (1985) also found
that most voters voted for a party whose perceived ideological position was
closest to theirs.
As described above, Japan’s party system had its origin in the cleavage
characterized by the opposition between two political ideologies. There was
no other option than the LDP for those who supported the liberal democratic
regime. The defeat of the LDP government directly meant a regime change
from a liberal democracy to a socialist regime that the liberal democrats could
not accept. Thus, the LDP supporters were almost forced to approve of the
LDP government’s job performance, even when they found problems with it.
2.1.2 LDP as the Only Party That Has an Ability to
Govern
While ideology had remained important during the entire period of the LDP’s
one party dominant regime(Kabashima and Takenaka 1996), there was an-
other factor that associated LDP support with cabinet support in people’s
minds. Although the LDP maintained the conservative platform, insisting
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on a “self-made” constitution, and ideologically in opposition to the JSP and
other progressive groups, the LDP began to put more emphasis on economic
development than on ideological issues. They had learned a lesson from bitter
and violent conflicts inside and outside the Diet over the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in 1960.
Under the leadership of the LDP government headed by Prime Minis-
ter Hayato Ikeda, Japan experienced rapid economic growth, which allowed
the LDP to attract more voters who were not ideologically committed to any
issues, and to become a “catch-all party.” The JSP, on the other hand, stub-
bornly remained an ideological party, even accepting “the dictatorship of the
proletariat” in its party platform (“Nihon ni okeru Shakaishugi eno Michi”:
The Road to Socialism in Japan) in 1966.
As a result, the LDP became perceived by most voters as the only
party that was capable of governing the country, due to its realistic view and
economic policy success. For example, analyzing voters’ free responses to the
survey question of party images asked in the JABISS survey of 19766 and the
JES survey of 1983,7 Miyake (1988) found that voters’ positive images about
the LDP mostly came from its administrative and governing ability. These
images included “ability to govern,” “reliability,” “policy and ideology suitable
for the Japanese,” “comprehension,” and “foreign policy competence.” On the
6“JABISS” is based on the names of the binational group of five scholars who wrote
The Japanese Voter (1991, Yale University Press): J for Japan and Joji Watanuki, A for




other hand, voters are skeptical about the JSP’s competence as a government
party, having negative images about it, including “no ability to govern,” “no
reliability,” and “no executive ability.”
The JSP and other opposition parties were expected by voters not to
take power, but to play only a minor role in checking the LDP government.
Showing that the LDP’s superiority to all opposition parties, measured by
a difference in the number of seats in the House of Representatives, lowered
voters’ support for the LDP in elections during the 1980s, Inoguchi (1983)
concluded that voters wanted the LDP government to continue, but not to be-
come very powerful. Furthermore, Kabashima (1998) calls such voters “buffer
players” in the sense that they have incentives to both reward and punish the
LDP to ensure its public responsiveness.
The JSP and other opposition parties seemed to accept this situation.
Without proposing any realistic alternatives, the opposition parties behaved
as if they were only interested in “opposition for opposition’s sake,” although
they were more supportive of the cabinet bills than people thought. Knowledge
of policy-making was accumulated only inside the LDP and the bureaucracy.
The LDP politicians usually asked for the help of bureaucrats in policy making
without hiring their own policy staffs, while the bureaucrats often used LDP
politicians to influence legislature.8
8In 1993, as a part of political reform under the non-LDP coalition government, the
position of a staff member in charge of policy-making paid for by the government was
established to enhance politicians’ policy-making ability.
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2.2 The Change in the Relationship
As we have seen so far, the LDP support was strongly related to cabinet
support during the 1955 party system because of voters’ perception that only
the LDP represented liberal democratic values, and had the ability to govern
the country. After the 1980s, however, the relationship was gradually altered
by the changing political environments surrounding the LDP and Japan.
2.2.1 The Collapse of Socialism
In the 1980s, as it became obvious that a liberal democracy guaranteed a better
standard of living for people than a socialist regime, most Japanese voters
began to consider socialism a failed political system. Ironically, this made the
JSP more acceptable to voters because socialism was not realistic enough to be
a threat to the well-established Japanese liberal democratic regime any more.
The JSP achieved a victory in the 1989 House of Councillors election where
they emphasized opposition to the LDP government’s attempt to introduce the
consumption tax, and showed itself as a party for women, with many female
candidates.
According to Kabashima (1992), who analyzed the Meisuikyo election
survey,9 6.3 percent of the “strong” LDP supporters voted for the JSP in 1989,
while none of them did so in the House of Representatives election of 1986.
Also, 23.0 percent of the “weak” LDP supporters voted for the JSP in 1989,
9Meisuikyo is an abbreviation for Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyoukai (the Association for
Promoting Fair Elections).
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whereas only 2.7 percent of them did so in 1986. Moreover, the proportion of
independent voters who casted votes for the JSP increased from 8 percent in
1986 to 40 percent in 1989.
This was not an exceptional phenomena exclusive to 1989, but part of
the declining trend in the association between ideology and party support.
Tanaka (1996) showed that a correlation between voters’ ideology and pat-
tern of party support had declined since 1976, as shown in Figure 2.1. The
correlations are higher when there is a stronger tendency for conservatives to
support the LDP and for progressives to support the JSP and the JCP. The
correlation was very high in the 1970s (around .75), but declined drastically
in the mid-1980s (to about .60), and finally reached as low of .46 in 1987.
While the JSP remained an ideological party, the JSP supporters be-
come more moderate by the late 1980s. Analysing data from the Jiji opinion
polls, Miyake (2001) showed that the proportion of the JSP supporters who
thought Japan should be in the liberal camp rather than the communist camp
increased from 27 percent in 1970 to 54 percent in 1989, whereas the LDP
supporters consistently thought that Japan should belong to the liberal camp
(82 percent in 1970 and 89 percent in 1989). Miyake (2001) also showed that
the proportion of the JSP supporters who liked the United States increased
from 18 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1990.
The decline in the ideology also contributed to the rise of indepen-
dent voters starting in the 1970s. The independent voters are less ideological,
younger, and more politically dissatisfied than partisan voters (Kabashima
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Figure 2.1 Correlations between Ideology and Party Support: 1972-93
Source: Tanaka (1996), Figure 13
Data: The Meisuikyo election survey, 1972-1993
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1998). Few of them are, however, always politically independent. Kabashima
(1998) showed that a proportion of voters who had no party support in all
seven-waves of the JESII (1993-96) was only 2.4 percent, while those who had
no party support at least once were about half of all voters. Miyake (1998)
called them “sporadic voters” who became politically independent as “tem-
poral refugees,” not directly changing their support from party to party. The
existence of these less ideological floating voters brought instability to cabinet
popularity rate, eroding the traditional partisan base of cabinet support.
The influence of ideology in Japanese political scene declined even more
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Even voters who held liberal
democratic values could safely vote for the JSP because of the drop in the
socialism significance. A liberal democratic regime was so self-evident that
voters could expect the regime to continue even if they stopped supporting
the LDP (Tanaka 1996). This also made it possible for new parties to emerge
in the early 1990s.
2.2.2 The Establishment of New Parties
The largest factor that changed the relationship between party support and
cabinet support was the establishment of new parties in 1993, which provided
the moderate supporters with new alternatives.10 In the wake of a series
of political corruption scandals which finally forced Prime Minister Noboru
Takeshita to resign in 1989, the LDP received harsh criticism and pressure to
10I referred to Kusano (1999), Curtis (1999), and Reed (2003) to make a brief description
of the political situation after 1993 in Japan.
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reform from citizens and opposition parties. The LDP cabinet, however, was
not successful in satisfying public demand for clean government, and failed
twice to pass political reform legislation in October 1992 and June 1993.
The delay triggered a reformist rebellion within the LDP. Morihiro
Hosokawa, who was a former member of the House of Councillors and Ku-
mamoto Prefecture governor, left the LDP to form the Japan New Party
(JNP, Nihon Shintou) in May 1992. The Renewal Party (RP, Shinseitou) was
founded in June 1993 by LDP faction leader Tsutomu Hata and his colleague
Ichirou Ozawa, along with 42 other LDP politicians who proposed a number
of political reforms, including electoral system reform by the introduction of
single member districts. Another reformist group within the LDP, consisting
of 10 relatively liberal and novice members, and headed by Masayoshi Take-
mura, established The New Party Sakigake (Shintou Sakigake) in June 1993.
These three parties joined the other opposition parties to pass a no-confidence
motion, and denied the LDP’s majority status in a subsequent election in July.
After the House of Representatives election of July 1993, eight oppo-
sition parties, including the three newly established parties, formed the first
non-LDP coalition government in almost 40 years. The coalition government
headed by the JSP’s Hosokawa began with the highest popularity rating ever
recored (71.9 percent), due to the voters’ expectation that it would do “some-
thing different.”(Reed 2003)
With such voters’ strong demand, some type of political reform was
virtually inevitable, because no party wanted to enter the next election as the
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party that had killed reform (Reed and Thies 2001). The way of enacting
political reform was, however, controversial even inside the coalition. The JSP
wanted a new electoral system to contain a proportional representation bloc,
which made a multi-party system seem to survive, while most other members
of the coalition aimed at establishing a two-party system by introducing single
member districts. The bills were finally passed in January 1994 after a compro-
mise in reducing the number of seats from proportional representation. This
favored the LDP and hurt the preference of the JSP. By defending their farm-
ing support base, the JSP also isolated themselves from other parties inside
the coalition on the issue of rice import liberalization.
When Prime Minister Hosokawa proposed a new tax, named the “na-
tional welfare tax” (kokumin fukushi zei), the opposition between the JSP,
which had long been opposing to the consumption tax, and other parties,
especially the RP - Koumei alliance, became clear inside the coalition. There-
fore, it was natural that the JSP (as well as Sakigake that also had been in
a bad relationship with the RP - Koumei alliance) was excluded from a new
coalition formed after the unexpected resignation of Prime Minister Hosokawa
in April 1994.
The new coalition government, headed by Hata of the RP, was a minor-
ity government, and survived for only about two months. After the resigna-
tion of Hata, who thought that no-confident motion was unavoidable, the LDP
and the JSP formed a coalition. The LDP was so hungry for power that they
accepted the JSP’s demands that the new prime minister be Tomiichi Mu-
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rayama, the JSP leader, and that the LDP protect the Constitution. Sakigake
also joined the coalition to play the role of a bridge between the traditional
enemies.
While the JSP continued to change their traditional policies concerning
the Self Defence Force, and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States and Japan in order to preserve a coalition with
the LDP, the opposition parties began to look for ways to form a new party,
expecting a general election under single-member districts. In December 1994,
the RP, Koumei, DSP, and the JNP merged into the New Frontier Party (NFP,
Shinshintou).
Despite difficulty maintaining the unity of the parties with different
backgrounds and policy preferences, the NFP exceeded expectations in the
1995 House of Councillors election with a 20 seat gain and the largest share of
the proportional representation vote. While the LDP enjoyed a gain in a few
seats, the JSP suffered a huge loss, which lead to inside criticism for being a
coalition partner with the LDP, and caused some members to leave the party.
In January 1996, Prime Minister Murayama resigned and gave premiership to
the LDP leader, Ryuutarou Hashimoto, followed by the name change of the
JSP to the Social Democratic Party (SDP, Shakai Minshutou).
In October 1996, the House election saw no clear winner. The LDP
gained 28 seats, but still did not recover a majority, whereas the SDP, Saki-
gake, and the NFP lost seats. The Democratic Party (DP, Minshutou), estab-
lished by Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan from Sakigake in September 1996,
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became the third largest party with 52 seats, but failed to get their “new party
boom”(Reed 2003).
The LDP, however, finally achieved a majority by picking up defectors
from the NFP and other parties after the election. The NFP had no way to
prevent the members, including even core members, from defecting. Moreover,
even Hata, the former Prime Minister and partner of Ozawa, left the NFP, and
formed his own party, named the Sun Party (Taiyoutou), at the end of 1996.
Facing a growing criticism from novice members for his unaccountability and
top-down decision making style, Ozawa finally decided to desolve the NFP, and
reorganized his group as the Liberal Party (LP, Jiyuutou). Other groups within
the NFP also formed their own parties, such as Koumei, The New Party Peace
(Shintou Heiwa), The New Party Friendship (Shintou Yuuai), The National
Voice (Kokumin no Koe), and the Reformist Club (Kaikaku Kurabu). Most
members of these parties, with the exception of Koumei, finally joined the DP
through Minseitou.
Figure 2.2 shows the party realignment in the 1990s described above.
For this period, there existed more than twenty parties, including some which
do not appear in the figure. In short, the political environment surrounding
Japanese voters changed dramatically after July 1993.
Citizens generally welcomed the new parties’ eagerness for reforms, and
did not see them in the context of the traditional “left - right” opposition
between parties. Using a factor analysis method for mapping party ideological
positions, as perceived by voters, Miyake (1998) showed that voters recog-
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Figure 2.2 Party Realignment in the 1990s
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nized the opposition between new parties and existing parties over the issues
of “political system reform” and “change of administration.” In the same
manner, Tanaka (1996) pointed out that the opposition between progressives
and conservatives existed in voters’ minds in 1976 and 1981, but disappeared
in 1995.
The new parties also differed from existing opposition parties in vot-
ers’ perception of their governing ability. As their leaders were experienced
politicians from the LDP, these parties naturally shared moderate and less ide-
ological mainstream values with the LDP, while the JSP and the JCP obviously
had their own strong political ideologies. At the same time, the Democratic
Socialist Party (DSP, Minshu Shakaitou, Minshatou) was backed by conserva-
tive labor unions, and Koumeitou (The Clean Government Party) was rooted
in a Buddhist group. Voters expected the new parties to have more ability to
govern than other traditional opposition parties, including the JSP.
According to Kabashima (1998), the proportion of voters who referred
to the LDP as a party that has the ability to govern dropped from 53.6 per-
cent in 1983 to 36.8 percent in 1995, while the proportion of voters who held
confidence in opposition parties’ governing ability increased from 12.4 percent
to 32.9 percent (the NFP: 21.1 percent, the JSP: 6.4 percent, Sakigake: 1.7
percent, the JCP: 0.8 percent, and other parties: 2.9 percent).
The fact that these new parties were perceived by voters to have the
ability to govern brought instability to the relationship between party support
and cabinet support. As discussed earlier, the LDP government could enjoy
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a loyal support from LDP supporters because the LDP was the only party
that was perceived by voters to have the ability to govern. As the new parties
had to compete with the LDP, however, their government did not benefit from
favorable public view.
2.2.3 The Rise of the New TV News Shows
After the 1980s, voter’s attitudes toward the prime minister began to affect
their support for the government when TV news shows, in which newscast-
ers focused on individual politicians and sometimes criticized them, achieved
popularity among citizens. TV news programs in Japan had been descriptive,
neutral, or objective in the sense that newscasters merely reported facts based
on information released by the government without their interpretation, which
contributed to conserving the LDP’s one party regime (Krauss 2002).
Voters had few ways to receive information on the personalities of politi-
cians, including the prime minister, and therefore rarely took them into con-
sideration when casting a vote. Party labels, especially that of the LDP, were
much more important than candidate personalities when making political de-
cisions, at least, for ordinary citizens.11 The influence of the party label on
voting behavior, however, declined after TV news programs started to pro-
vide stories focusing on individual politicians, especially in election times. As
Krauss (2002) showed, the gap between LDP popularity and cabinet popularity
11Although a Kouenkai, or a politician’s individual support group, has been said to be
powerful in elections, a majority of people do not belong to any such group (Kabashima
1988).
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was prominent after the Nakasone administration, which is called “presiden-
tialization of the prime minister’ role” (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3 Presidentialization of the Prime Minister?
Data: Monthly support rates for the LDP and cabinet, 1960-1993, drawn
from monthly polls of the Jiji press.
While prime ministers had been expected to implement policies with
a consensus of the party members, “presidentialized” prime ministers, such
as Yasuhiro Nakasone and Jun’ichiro Koizumi, sometimes directly appealed
to the public to overcome opposition from inside the party. Thus, cabinets
headed by such prime minister were perceived by voters to be so different
from the LDP that voters did not associate the party with the prime minister
in evaluating his cabinet.
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2.3 Japanese Politics after the non-LDP Coali-
tion Government
Since returning to power with Murayama-headed SP in June 1994, the LDP has
assumed the most important part of the coalition governments, but its coalition
partner has changed several times, and the LDP’s majority government has not
yet been established. After the general election of 1996, the LDP experienced
minority status in the House of Representatives due to its seat loss and the
secession of the SP and Sakigake from the coalition. Even worse, a defeat
in the House of Councillors election of July 1998 prompted Prime Minister
Hashimoto to resign.
The LDP’s Keizou Obuchi, who assumed premiership from Hashimoto,
soon after began to approach potential coalition partners, the Liberal Party
(LP) and Koumeitou, to form a majority government. A coalition agreement
was achieved with the Liberal Party headed by Ichirou Ozawa in January
1999, and then with Koumeitou in October 1999. The members of the LP,
however, did not necessarily welcome Koumeitou to the administration, being
afraid of losing their influence on policy-making processes, and finally decided
to dissolve the agreement in April 2000.
In his effort to deal with the aftermath of the LP’s secession, Obuchi
suffered a stroke, slipped into a coma, and was soon replaced by Yoshirou
Mori. The Mori administration had two coalition partners, Koumeitou and the
Conservative Party (Hoshutou), which consisted of the former LP members.
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The coalition framework has remained the same since the Mori administration
except that the Conservative Party merged into the LDP.
Although the LDP-led coalition governments in this period were influ-
enced by their coalition partners,12 the LDP’s infamous faction politics were
still evident to citizens, especially in the process of selecting a prime minister.
Obuchi was criticized by the media for being selected from the same faction
as Hashimoto, who resigned to take the blame for defeat in the 1996 general
election. Mori was believed to be chosen in a secret meeting of five of the
LDP’s veteran politicians. These cases gave citizens an impression that fac-
tions’ interests were more influential than the public opinion, even inside the
coalition.
2.4 Discussion: 1993 as a Change Point?
As seen from the description so far, it is likely that any change in the political
psychology of Japanese citizens happened in the early 1990s. The collapse
of the LDP’s one-party dominant regime, triggered by the general election of
1993, not only caused but also reflected the change. The question is, however,
what makes the early 1990s different from other periods of change in Japanese
post-war political history-for instance, the 1970s. As in the early 1990s, polit-
ical scandals and corruptions lead to the defeat of the LDP in elections, and
triggered the establishment of a new party in the 1970s (Cox and Rosenbluth
12For example, the LP urged the government to establish “Senior Vice-Minister” positions
in 1999, while Koumei was the strong force behind the Shopping Coupons System in 1999.
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1995).
The 1970s was called the “age of transition” or “close balance between
the ‘conservatives’ and ‘progressives’ ” (hokaku hakuchuu), as symbolized by a
narrow seven seat margin between the LDP and opposition parties in the House
of Councillors election of 1974. After the election, Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka was almost forced to resign, under harsh criticism from citizens and the
media for his political corruption. Even worse, as a reaction to the Lockheed
bribery scandals for which Tanaka was arrested in 1976, some members of
the LDP formed the “New Liberal Club” (NLC, Shin-Jiyuu Kurabu), claiming
the “renewal of conservative politics.” The LDP and NLC formed the first
coalition government after the 1955 party system was established.
NLC in the 1970s and new parties in the 1990s, such as JNP and NFP,
shared some characteristics. First, they were established by former LDP politi-
cians who pursued political reform. Therefore, they also had more realistic and
feasible policies than traditional opposition or left-wing parties. Finally, this
brought them a victory in an election, and allowed them to be part of the
administration.
Despite these similarities, however, the 1970s did not see a fundamental
change. As suggested in this chapter, the biggest reason was probably that
voters’ partisanship was still strong enough at that time that new parties were
not influential. In the 1970s, most voters were partisan, while almost half of
them were politically independent in the 1990s, as seen in Figure 2.4. Voters
had an incentive to only temporally punish the LDP, but did not want to let
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other political parties than the LDP to rule.
Figure 2.4 Changes in Partisanship in Japan, 1962-2002
Source: Tanaka and Martin (2003), Figure 1.
Data: The Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Polls.
“New Conservatives” identify themselves as supporters of one of the
following parties: New Liberal Club from 1976 to 1988, Japan New Party
(Nippon Shintou), New Party Sakigake, Renewal Party (Shinseitou), New
Frontier Party (Shinshintou), or Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutou).
Those partisans identifying with one of the “Central Parties” support either
the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshatou) or Koumeitou. “Left Parties”
refer to supporters of the Japan Communist Party, Japan Socialist Party, or
Social Citizens League (Shaminren) depending on years.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter overviewed the relationship between LDP support and cabinet
support under the 1955 party system, and suggested the possibility that the
relationship became weaker due to changes took place in the late 1980s. The
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LDP government enjoyed a loyal support from its supporters, thanks to the
ideological opposition between parties. Because the LDP was the only party
that endorsed a liberal democratic regime, liberal democrats had no choice but
to support the LDP government as well as the LDP. As the socialist threat
lost its reality, however, the liberal democrats became less ardent in backing
the LDP government, having an incentive to punish the government.
The LDP government also benefited in terms of maintaining power from
voters’ perception that only the LDP was able to govern the country. The
rapid economic development under the LDP made the party look attractive
to voters from different backgrounds, and these voters supported the LDP
and its government. In fact, the LDP and its government were associated
with each other so strongly in voters’ minds that the supporting the LDP and
supporting the government had almost the same meaning. Thus, LDP support
and cabinet support covaried over time. The establishment of new parties,
however, threatened the position of the LDP as the only party that was able to
govern the country. Voters also perceived the new parties to have a potential
to govern well because the party leaders were experienced conservative and
moderate politicians. The “government party” was not necessarily the LDP
for the voters any more.
Another reason voters began to distinguish between the LDP and the
government was that the personality of the prime minister became more salient
to them due to the change in how the mass media reported political news. Pre-
viously, the media coverage of politics tended to be objective and neutral, in
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the sense that they merely reported official information. In the 1980s, how-
ever, the media began to focus on individual politicians, including the prime
minister, with their own interpretation. This also weakened the association
between the LDP and the government headed by the prime minister.
All of these suggest that there was likely to be a significant change in
voters’ mind in the early 1990s. Party support lost its significance as a refer-
ence for voters to make political decisions, and as a base for cabinet support.
Before I take a deep look at the changing relationship, the next chapter exam-
ines the relationship between party support, cabinet support, and the economy
over time as a preliminary analysis.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Party Support on
Cabinet Support
This chapter examines the effect of government party support on cabinet
support to provide a basis for analyses of the changing effect in later chapters.
More specifically, I investigate how cabinet support, party support, and the
economy influence each other.
Cabinet support has been studied mainly in the context of retrospective
evaluation of the cabinet’s performance in Japan. Inoguchi (1980) examines
the relationship between cabinet support and the state of the economy, taking
government monetary policy into consideration for each period after World
War II. Nishizawa (2001) correlates the movement of cabinet support over
time with voters’ perception of the economy. Not only aggregate data, but also
survey data, find the effect of retrospective evaluation of cabinet performance
in various policy areas on cabinet support(Hirano 1993).
On the other hand, party support has been considered another impor-
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tant variable in explaining cabinet support level among citizens. Many studies
have assumed that party support is a base for cabinet support (Inoguchi 1980;
Nishizawa 2001; Krauss 2002).1 This assumption reflects the fact that the
LDP was more salient than the cabinet as a single ruler that made the coun-
try prosperous for almost forty years as described in Chapter 2. That is,
citizens developed trust in the LDP’s ability to govern, and referred to it in
evaluating the cabinet’s performance.
3.1 Data
I analyze data compiled by the Jiji Press. Early each month, a representative
sample of Japanese is interviewed in person and asked which party they cur-
rently support and whether they support the current prime minister’s cabinet.
The methodology and question wording have remained unchanged through
this entire period. I study the period from June 1960 to March 2001, for a
total of 490 monthly observations.
Other variables included in the analysis are government party support
and Consumer Price Index (CPI). Government party support rate is calculated
by summing up support rates for all political parties in government. Before
August 1993, government support rate was the same as LDP support. CPI
is the ratio of the consumer price index to that of the year before. The idea
is that, if consumer price index goes up significantly over the previous year,
then it is more likely to have a negative effect on cabinet support. In Inoguchi
1Burden (2005), however, claims the unidirectional influence of cabinet support on party
support.
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(1980), this variable generally shows an anticipated negative effect on cabinet
support, but the significance of its effect seems to depend highly upon model
specifications. This is the only economic variable in my model simply because
there is no monthly income variable (usually measured by GDP). However,
in Inoguchi (1980), yearly data indicated the income variable played a less
important role than the price variable in explaining cabinet support. His
research showed that the income variable was no longer significant if the price
variable was added to the model.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show cabinet support and government party
support over this period. Comparing the two time-series, it is obvious that
cabinet support fluctuates more than party support over time. Moreover, the
discrepancy between cabinet support and party support tends to be larger
after the 1980s.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Political and Economic Variables, June
1960-March 2001
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Cabinet Support 490 35.01 9.99 4.40 67.40
Gov. Party Support 490 31.50 4.95 9.60 52.90
CPI 490 66.38 30.05 18.50 102.20
Source: Jiji Public Opinion Polls, 1960-2001.
The rest of the chapter verifies stationarity of each time-series by the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and then analyzes the multivariate relationship
using vector autoregression (VAR).
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Figure 3.1 Party Support and Cabinet Popularity in Japan, 1960-2001
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3.2 ADF Tests
In essence, the Dickey-Fuller test for determining whether a time series is
integrated involves the regression of first differences of the series on its lagged
levels. If the series is stationary, the regression coefficient associated with
the lagged levels will be negative and significant. The ADF test includes a
number of lags of the first differences on the right-hand side of the regression
equation and is appropriate if the resulting coefficients are significant (Engle
and Granger 1987). Critical values for these tests are greater than normal,
due to nonstandard distributions, and are reported by MacKinnon (1991).
The data-dependent general-to-specific criterion is used to choose the
optimum lag structure for the error process of the Dickey-Fuller equation as
advocated by Ng and Perron (1995) and Perron (1997). Under this process,
the specific order is chosen out of the general order (I considered here 17 lags
based on the Schwert’s rule of thumb: m = Int{12(T/100) 14}) on the basis of
the standard t-tests of significance for the lag terms.
Table 3.2 Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for a Unit Root
Regression: ∆zt = α0 + α1t + α2zt−1 +
∑m
i=1 βi∆zt−i + ϵt
ADF Lag order(m)
Cabinet Support -5.816* 3
Gov. Party Support -4.680* 2
CPI -.832 14
An asterisk indicates significance (rejection of the unit root null) at the 5 per
cent level.
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The results in Table 3.2 suggest that the series of cabinet support and
government party support are stationary, while CPI is nonstationary. There-
fore, I take the first difference of CPI.
3.3 The VAR Model
I examine the relationship between the variables using Vector Autoregression
(VAR) methodology. VAR (Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989; Simms 1980)
helps to evaluate the causal directions of the relationships between cabinet
support, government party support, and CPI. I select VAR (instead of other
causal modeling alternatives, such as three-stage least squares) because I want
to examine the determinants of cabinet support without making the variables
a priori exogenous.
VAR is a multivariate extension of the Granger (1969) approach to
causal inference. Each dependent variable is regressed on lagged values of
itself and other dependent variables in the system. VAR provides an excellent
control for history, by taking into account several lags of all of the endogenous
variables in the system.
I determine lag lengths empirically using methods based on Simms
(1980). Table 3.3 shows the process. The likelihood ratios(LR) are calculated
to test if there is a difference in log-likelihood between the pair of different
lag specifications (up to 20 lags). The first look at the results suggests that
appropriate lag length is 8, 10, 12, or 14. Calculating the likelihood ratios
for all possible pairs of the candidates, I finally find that the appropriate lag
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length is 14.
Table 3.3 Likelihood Ratio Tests for Lag Order
Pair for Comparison LR Pair for Comparison LR
Lag = 1 vs. Lag = 2 75.739* Lag = 16 vs. Lag = 17 12.141
Lag = 2 vs. Lag = 3 19.181* Lag = 17 vs. Lag = 18 4.286
Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 4 14.518 Lag = 18 vs. Lag = 19 11.303
Lag = 4 vs. Lag = 5 20.992* Lag = 19 vs. Lag = 20 3.412
Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 6 35.214*
Lag = 6 vs. Lag = 7 24.493* Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 8 116.933*
Lag = 7 vs. Lag = 8 21.109* Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 10 164.695*
Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 9 12.647 Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 12 307.384*
Lag = 9 vs. Lag = 10 37.127* Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 14 336.239*
Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 11 15.973 Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 10 49.244*
Lag = 11 vs. Lag = 12 127.121* Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 12 192.533*
Lag = 12 vs. Lag = 13 10.694 Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 14 222.924*
Lag = 13 vs. Lag = 14 21.445* Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 12 142.904*
Lag = 14 vs. Lag = 15 11.285 Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 14 174.339*
Lag = 15 vs. Lag = 16 7.608 Lag = 12 vs. Lag = 14 31.875*
An asterisk indicates significance (rejection of no difference) at the
5 percent level.
LR = (T − k)(log|DR| − log|DU |) ∼ χ2(q), where DR is the matrix
of cross products of residuals when the model is restricted; DU is the
same matrix for the unrestricted model; k is the total number of regression
coefficients estimated divided by the number of equations; q is the number of
restrictions.
VAR evaluates relationships by conducting joint hypothesis tests for
the blocks of lags associated with each variable. In sum, the VAR model is
essentially a series of regression equations where each endogenous variable in
the system is set equal to lagged values of itself and all of the other variables






















































































where cov(ε1t, ε2s) = σ12 for t = s; cov(ε1t, ε2s) = 0 otherwise. The VAR model
has many parameters, and they may be difficult to interpret due to complex
interactions and feedback between the variables in the model. As a result,
the dynamic properties of a VAR are often summarized using various types of
structural analysis. The two main types of structural analysis summaries are
Granger causality tests and impulse response functions.
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3.3.1 Granger Causality and Impulse Response Func-
tions
First, to examine the causal relationships between the variables, I perform
Granger tests(Freeman 1983; Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989). There are two
main interests. The first is a test of whether cabinet support Granger causes
government party support, and the second is a test of whether government
party support Granger causes cabinet support. For the first Granger test, if
the null is rejected, we infer that cabinet support Granger causes government
party support. Under the second Granger test, if the null is rejected, we infer
that government party support Granger causes cabinet support.
Table 3.4 Direction of Granger Causality
Independent variable Cabinet support Gov. party support CPI
Cabinet support - .962 .934
Gov party support .001 - .420
CPI .000 .034 -
Note. Each variable was lagged 14 months. OLS estimates.
The numbers are block F-test p-values.
The results appear in Table 3.4. Each cell in the table represents an
estimated equation. The p values associated with each equation appear in the
cells of the table. The first test is for whether cabinet support has any effect on
government party support. I estimate with a p value of .962 that it does not.
Thus we can infer that exogenous shocks to cabinet support will not affect the
movement of government party support over time.
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I also test whether government party support affects the movement of
cabinet support over time, and estimate with p = .001 that government party
support does affect cabinet support. The statistical evidence demonstrates
that cabinet support is Granger caused by government party support. While
movement in government party support over time will cause shifts in cabi-
net support, shocks to cabinet support will leave government party support
unchanged.
The orthogonal impulse response graphs supplement our interpretation
of the table results. The orthogonal impulse response can be interpreted as the
effects of the components of the standardized shock process ηt on the process
yt, in the triangular structural VAR(14) model
























Figure 3.3.1 shows the impulse response functions along with asymp-
totic standard errors. Each figure shows the responses of ∆yt to the structural
shocks. There is a positive, long-lived response in cabinet support when gov-
ernment party support increases by one standard deviation, while there is no
response in government party support to cabinet support. Additionally, both
cabinet support and government party support are responsive to CPI, but the
influence seems weak.
Figure 3.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model
Cabinet support → government party support
Cabinet support → CPI
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Figure 3.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model(continued)
Government party support → cabinet support
Government party support → CPI
Figure 3.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model(continued)
CPI → cabinet support
CPI → government party support
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3.4 Conclusion
The results leave us with two implications. First, Japanese data confirm no
causality from cabinet support to party support, while Clarke and Lebo (2003)
have observed the effect of prime ministerial approval on government party
support in Britain.2 This discrepancy may be explained by political history,
although approval of a cabinet’s performance is conceptually different from
that of prime ministerial approval. As I have shown, the 1955 party system
can be characterized as the LDP’s one-party dominant system. Under the
system, people were impressed that the LDP had more power than the prime
minister in affecting the administration, and the party was almost equivalent
to the government, whereas administration change has been typical in Britain.
In addition, prime ministerial terms have been so much shorter in Japan than
in Britain that Japanese people have more difficulty recognizing the prime
minister’s influence over the administration.
Second, I can straightforwardly model cabinet support with a simple
recursive system. Although this is consistent with Krauss (2002) and In-
oguchi (1980), it is contradicted by Burden (2005)(unpublished manuscript)
who claims that cabinet support influences LDP support in Japan. The possi-
ble reasons are technical ones. First, the periods included in the analyses are
different. While the analysis in this chapter includes 1960-2001 data exclud-
ing the Koizumi administration (2001-2006), which seems to be very different
2Clarke and Lebo (2003) do not examine the effect of government party support on prime
ministerial approval.
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from other administrations, Burden examines data from 1960-2004 excluding
the non-LDP coalition government period (from August 1993 to June 1994).
Second, while this chapter’s analysis focuses on “government party” support,
Burden uses only LDP support. Third, while lag order in the VAR model
is 14 in this chapter’s analysis, it is 3 in Burden’s analysis using Akaike’s
information criterion to determine lag order.
54
Chapter 4
The Changing Effect of Party
Support on Cabinet Support
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the changing effect of party support on cabinet sup-
port over time. Previous studies using time series analysis approaches have
suggested the strong effect of party support on cabinet support, indicating
that Japanese voters strongly tend to show their support for a government in
which their favorite party takes part. These time-series studies have ignored
the changing impact of party support on cabinet support, assuming that the
effect is constant over time. There are, however, enough reasons to suspect
this assumption.
In this chapter, I examine two possibilities for the way on which the ef-
fect changed from 1961 to 2001 in Japan, using the ARFIMA (AutoRegressive
Fractionally Integrated Moving Average) model and time-varying parameter
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modeling. The next section articulates these possibilities, reviewing previous
studies. Section 3 constructs a time-varying parameter model that can approx-
imate the behavioral change implied in the possibilities. Section 4 estimates
the model, using the 1960-2001 data on the Japanese electorate’s political
support for the cabinet. Section 5 draws conclusions from this data.
4.2 Possibilities of Instability
Party support, an equivalent concept to party identification in the United
States,1 has played a central role in the study of the Japanese voting behavior
(Miyake 1985, 1998). This fact is also found in the time-series studies of
cabinet support. Inoguchi (1980) showed that the LDP support rates had a
statistically significant effect on cabinet support rates from 1960 to 1976 in
his time-series model. Nishizawa (2001) confirmed the strong effect of LDP
support on cabinet support for the period of August 1980 to July 1993, finding
that the economic evaluation did not matter for partisan voters.
These findings may be good evidence that party support has a strong
impact on cabinet support. It should be noted, however, that there is an
1Miyake (1998) pointed out the danger of viewing party identification and party support
in the same light, claiming that party identification could “not be applied to explain the
situation in Japan in its pure form.” He, however, also accepted that the theoretical inter-
pretation of party support was highly influenced by the studies of party identification in the
United States, and that these two concepts empirically shared many characteristics such as
universality, representativeness and stability. I believe that party identification and party
support are comparable to each other. There has been, however, few study to show the em-
pirical similarity and difference between party identification and party support(Nishizawa
1998). An exception is Mimura (2006) who examined the empirical difference in how voters
form party identification and party support.
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assumption in time-series analyses that the effect of an independent variable on
a dependent variable is constant over the period of analysis. If this assumption
does not hold true, or if the impact varies due to a change in social and political
environment, our knowledge of party support will be in question.
In fact, there are two possibilities regarding the roots of changing effect
of party support on cabinet support.
4.2.1 “Presidentialization” of the Prime Minister’s Role
First, the effect may change over time due to “presidentialization” of the prime
minister’s role. This word makes students of Japanese politics think of prime
minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987). Elected as prime minister in Novem-
ber 1982, he characterized his top-down decision making style as “presidential
prime minister.” As he had no firm supporting base within the LDP, he had
always needed to draw strong support from the public in performing his strong
leadership and in implementing policies. For that purpose, he tried to appeal
to the public through the mass media, showing his tall figure even among the
world leaders gathering at the G-7 meetings and his intimate relationship with
Ronald Reagan. People’s enthusiastic support for Nakasone enabled him to be
successful in tackling difficult tasks, including the privatization of state-owned
companies such as the Japan National Railways (Kokutetsu) and the Japan
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (Dendenkousha).
Often compared with Nakasone is Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi
(2001 - 2006). Known as a “lone wolf,” he unexpectedly got elected as leader
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of the LDP through the “rebellion” of the lay members, without strong sup-
port from any factions within the LDP, then became prime minister in April
2001. His victory in competitions for party leadership and premiership was
widely welcomed by the majority of the public; his enormous popularity was
called the “Koizumi phenomena.” Showing his unique personality to the public
through his speeches and populist performances outside and inside the Diet,
he mobilized public support for the privatization of the Japan Post, which
many conservative LDP politicians had strongly opposed.
As suggested by the styles of these two prime ministers, “presidential
prime minister” in Japanese context typically stands for a prime minister who
performs strong leadership in implementing his own policies through appeal
to the general public. Because of his style of politics, he can be free from the
influence of the public view toward his party. In other words, voters support
his cabinet not because it is their favorite party’s cabinet, but because it is
their favorite prime minister’s cabinet.
Krauss (Krauss 2002) claims that the phenomena of the “presidential
prime minister” in Japan is not only due to the personality of individual prime
ministers, but also to the change in the socio-political environment surrounding
prime ministers. Showing that the gap between average cabinet support rate
and average LDP support rate has been growing, he holds: “After Nakasone,
the electorate’s support for individual prime ministers and cabinets became
independent of support for a particular political party” (Krauss 2002, p.9), and
calls this phenomena the “presidentialization of the prime minister’s role.”
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This “presidentialization” was caused by the growing influence of TV
on Japanese politics. Previously, the mass media tried to keep their neutrality
and objectivity in reporting political news in Japan. Japan’s sole public broad-
caster, NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyoukai), is especially known for its dry, visually
boring, and descriptive reporting. Its news programs tended to report the
role of anonymous bureaucrats working for public interests more often than
the role of politicians and prime minister in policy making processes, which
contributed to the LDP’s one-party dominant regime for almost forty years.
Since the mid-1980s, however, a new type of news program has been
influential in reforming the public attitude toward politics. Starting in Octo-
ber 1985, for example, a TV program, the News Station, emerged as a totally
different tactic in reporting political news. On the News Station, politicians
are described as individuals with their own personalities. As the News Station
became popular, other news programs followed its way of reporting political
news. Politicians, bureaucrats, and voters recognized the power of newscasters
and commentators to influence even election outcomes. Since the mid 1980s,
interpretative news reports have prevailed, and TV news programs have ac-
quired strong impacts on the public opinion in Japan.2
This implies the possibility that the impact of party support on cabinet
support became weaker after the mid-1980s when news programs began to
report political news in a strategic frame. If this is true, the decline in the
2Taniguchi (2002) showed that voters who usually watch the News Station are more
likely to have cynical views about politics (and less likely to participate in politics) than
those who watch the NHK News 7.
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influence of party support on cabinet support must be observed after the mid
1980s.
4.2.2 Instability of Support for New Parties
Secondly, the effect of party support on cabinet support may change over
time due to instability of voters’ support for new parties. After the LDP’s
one-party rule was ended in August 1993, as a result of the general election
in July, Japanese voters experienced instable coalition governments as well
as frequent emergence and dissolution of political parties. The pattern of
coalitions changed seven times in ten years from the Hosokawa administration,
in which all of the former opposition parties except the Japan Communist
Party participated, to the second Koizumi cabinet, consisting of the LDP and
Koumei. For the same period, there existed more than twenty parties that
had their seats in the Diet. In short, the political environment surrounding
Japanese voters changed dramatically after July 1993.
The frequent changes in the pattern of coalitions and the dissolution
and emergence of political parties influenced the voters’ political attitude.
Analyzing the change in party support of Japanese voters in the seven-wave
panel studies of the 1993-96 Japan Election Study II (JES II), Kabashima
(1998) drew the conclusion that party support was more instable than ex-
pected. In addition, he casted a doubt on the central role of party support in
explaining Japanese political attitudes, holding that it is problematic to treat
party support as an “ultimate,” exogenous, independent variable, like party
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identification in the Michigan model.
Party support was destabilized by the emergence of new parties. The
supporters of the new parties were much more likely to change their support
than those of the old parties, as their psychological attachment to their adapted
party had not grown yet. In addition, party support for the existing parties
was also destabilized because voters had more alternatives.
These findings imply the possibility of a decline in the effect of party
support on cabinet support. Under the LDP’s one-party rule, “LDP support
was a base of government support” (Inoguchi 1980) because of its stability.
Voters’ support for any new party, however, is likely to be less stable, and
therefore too much significance should not be taken from this change. In
other words, cabinet support under the coalition governments, including the
new parties, after August 1993 had no firm “base” of party support, and did
not change according to the frequent changes in voters’ support for the new
parties.
This possibility suggests that the effect of party support on cabinet
support decreases for the period of the Hosokawa cabinet, in which most of the
supporters of the cabinet were new party supporters, and that the effect returns
after the Murayama cabinet, in which the LDP took over the administration.
It should be noted, however, that there is another possibility of a de-
cline in the effect, which is due to a basic tenet of a coalition government:
there is always only one party to which prime minister belongs. Consider-
ing voters’ inclination to support a cabinet because of their adapted party
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support, how much of the cabinet the party “owns” must be important. To
measure the degree of “ownership” of the cabinet, it will matter whether or not
prime minister belongs to the party. Therefore it is predictable that when the
proportion of the supporters of prime minister’s party is large within a body
of all government supporters, the effect of party support on cabinet support
increases.
4.3 Illustration of the Idea
Given the possibility of parameter instability due to new parties, I utilize a
framework of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) to
illustrate this idea with empirical data. This heuristic approach helps us un-
derstand how a pattern of the change looks like. The objective of EITM is
to encourage political and social scientists to test empirical models that are
directly connected to a formal model (Granato and Scioli 2004; Granato, Lo
and Wong 2005). The motivation of EITM partly stems from the sentiment
that “there is still far too much data analysis without formal theory - and far
too much formal theory without data analysis”(Bartels and Brady 1993, 148).
Especially in the study of voting behavior, researchers have routinely
tested verbal theories using a quantitative model. By employing this approach,
however, difficulty arises in specifying the mechanism through which parame-
ters are identified, and in determining whether their theories or claimed causal
mechanisms are really verified.
Suppose, for example, the following model to be estimated:
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Cabinet Support = α + β (Government Party Support)
where α is a constant, and β is a parameter indicating the effect of party sup-
port on cabinet support. In a quantitative analysis, the value of the parameter
is estimated with data. If the estimate is statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level, it is concluded that the tested hypothesis is verified. The hypothesis
states why the researcher expects the estimate to be statistically significant.
However, the “reliance on statistically significant results means nothing when
the researcher makes little attempt to identify the origin of the parameters
in question”(Granato, Lo and Wong 2005). In other words, there are many
other possibilities for the causal mechanism than what the hypothesis assumes.
The statistically significant result merely tells us that party support influences
cabinet support, but still leaves a question of why party support influences
cabinet support.
The parameter should have identifiable origins that allow for the model
to be falsifiable. Formal theory may overcome this problem because it forces
clarity about assumptions and concepts, ensures logical consistency, and de-
scribes the underlying mechanisms that lead to outcomes. However, it can fail
to incorporate empirical findings to provide a more accurate depiction of the
specified relations, or it can simply be empirically untestable.
The EITM framework can provide a way to merge formal and empirical
analyses in a feasible manner. First, the EITM researchers relate behavioral
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and applied statistical concepts. For example, a behavioral concept, such as
“learning,” can be linked to applied statistical concepts, such as persistence
and measurement error, by the assumptions that current behavior depends
on past behavior (which suggests AR processes), and that people learn with
some errors (which suggests measurement error). Second, they link formal
and applied statistical analogues. In this step, a formal model is created to
identify parameters and obtain implications that are directly testable using a
statistical model.
To establish the relationship between partisanship and cabinet support,
I propose the following model in which an AR(1) process is an “applied sta-
tistical analogue” of voters’ loyalty to their party, or the strength of party
support. In the linkage between partisan loyalty and the persistence of party
support, I have defined the strength of partisanship as the parameter value
associated with a past value (t − 1) of party support.
Ct = α0 + α1Ct−1 + α2Pt + α3Et + u1t (4.1)
Po,t = β0 + β1Po,t−1 + β2Ct + u2t (4.2)
Pn,t = γ0 + γ1Pn,t−1 + γ2Ct + u3t (4.3)




where C is the support rate for a cabinet, P is the support rate for a govern-
ment party, E is the rate of positive retrospective evaluation of the national
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economy, Po is the support rate for all “old” parties in government, and Pn is
the support rate for all “new” parties in government.
Equation (4.1) describes cabinet support as a function of its past value,
party support, and economic evaluation. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) imply that
party support is a function of its past value and cabinet support. In these
equations, parameters β1 and γ1 indicate how persistent party support is, or
how dependent the present value is on the past value. A higher estimate
suggests more persistent support, or the existence of more loyal supporters.
As seen in these three equations, it is assumed that there is simultane-
ity between cabinet support and party support. Equation (4.4) shows that
government party support consists of support for new and old parties, and
Equation (4.5) defines xt as a proportion of a new party’s support rate to the
sum of support rates for all government parties.
Substituting (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.1), we obtain:
Ct = α0 + α1Ct−1 + α2{(β0 + β1Po,t−1 + β2Ct + u2t)
+(γ0 + γ1Pn,t−1 + γ2Ct + u3t)} + α3Et + u1t
= α0 + α1Ct−1 + α2β0 + α2β1Po,t−1 + α2β2Ct + α2u2t + α2γ0 + α2γ1Pn,t−1
+α2γ2Ct + α2u3t + α3Et + u1t
=
α0 + α2β0 + α2γ0
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
+
α1
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Ct−1 +
α2β1




1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Pn,t−1 +
α3
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Et
+
u1t + α2u2t + α2u3t
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
(4.6)
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Pn,t−1 = (Po,t−1 + Pn,t−1)xt−1
Pn,t−1 = xt−1Pt−1 (4.7)
Po,t−1 = (1 − xt−1)Pt−1 (4.8)
Substituting (4.7) and (4.8) into (4.6), we obtain:
Ct = Π1 + Π2Ct−1 + Π3Pt−1 + Π4Et + wt (4.9)
where
Π1 =
α0 + α2β0 + α2γ0
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Π2 =
α1
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Π3 =
α2β1(1 − xt−1) + α2γ1xt−1
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Π4 =
α3
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
wt =
u1t + α2u2t + α2u3t
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
Finally, the following empirical implications are derived.
Implication 1
If β1 > γ1(the persistence of Po is stronger than that of Pn), as xt−1
increases, the effect of Pt−1 on Ct decreases.
In other words, when old party supporters are more loyal than new party
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supporters, an increase in the proportion of new party supporters within a
group of all government party supporters leads to a decrease in the effect of
government party support on cabinet support. Although this claim may sound
common-sensical, the model is valuable in showing exactly how the strength
of party support is transformed into the effect of party support on cabinet
support, and why the partisan effect increases or decreases.




Solving (4.10), we have:
−α2β1 + α2γ1
1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
< 0
−α2β1 + α2γ1 < 0 (4.11)
4.11 is always true when β1 > γ1, as proposed above.
Implication 2
If α2 > 0(the effect of Pt on Ct is positive), as (β1 − γ1) increases, the
effect of Pt−1 on Ct decreases.
Π3 is also a function of (β1−γ1), which is a difference in the persistence of party
support between new and old government party supporters. As the difference
becomes larger, the effect becomes smaller, when party support has a positive






1 − α2β2 − α2γ2
< 0
−α2xt < 0. (4.12)
4.12 holds true as long as the effect of Pt on Ct is positive (α2 > 0), which is
very likely.
In short, the effect of party support on cabinet support changes over
time, depending on the proportion of new party supporters in a group of all
government party supporters (xt), and the difference in the parameter values
between new party support and old party support(β1 and γ1).
I estimate Equations (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) using data from the Jiji
public opinion poll from July 1981 to March 2001. The results are shown
below.
Ct = −2.325 + .86Ct−1 + .205Pt + .101Et + u1t
Po,t = 14.082 + .607Po,t−1 − .055Ct + u2t
Pn,t = −4.473 + .027Pn,t−1 + .264Ct + u3t
As expected, persistence of Pn (new party support rate) is weaker than
that of Po(old party support rate), which indicates that the supporters of new
parties are less loyal than those of old parties. Figure 4.1 shows the time plot
of the effect of party support on cabinet support as a function of xt.
As shown in this figure, the effect of party support on cabinet support
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Figure 4.1 Time Plot of the Effect of Party Support on Cabinet Support
suddenly dropped after August 1993 when the new parties joined a coalition
government for the first time. This was because the coalition government
formed in July 1993 was backed by the less loyal supporters of the new parties.
Since then, it has changed according to the proportion of the new party support
rate to all government party support rates.
4.4 Model
Given the illustration of a possible change pattern, how can the change in
th effect of party support on cabinet support be examined more rigorously?
In terms of time-series models shown in previous studies, the changing effect
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means parameter instability for the period of analysis. Therefore, how the
parameter changes over time should be examined. The model examined in
this chapter is:
Ct = β1 + β2Pt + β3Et + β4Ht + ut
where t = July 1960, ..., March 2001, C = cabinet support rate; P = support
rate for government parties (a sum of support rates for all government parties);
E = consumer price index (CPI: the average in 2000=100); and H = a dummy
variable indicating the month in which a cabinet started (1 for t = July 1960,
November 1964, July 1972, December 1974, January 1977, December 1978,
July 1980, December 1982, November 1987, June 1989, August 1989, and
November 1991, and 0 for otherwise).
This model is constructed based on knowledge from two different models
that explain cabinet support in Japan, which appear in Inoguchi (1980) and
Nishizawa (2001). First, P is the most important variable for explaining C. In
both Inoguchi (1980) and Nishizawa (2001), this variable strongly showed its
anticipated positive effect on cabinet support. Inoguchi (1980) claimed that
LDP support is a basis which cabinet support is built upon or withdrawn from,
and that cabinet support is influenced by personality and mood factors more
than LDP support is. Support rate for government parties is equivalent to the
support rate for the LDP before July 3, but it is the sum of support rates for
all parties that participate in a coalition after August 1993.
Second, E is the ratio of the consumer price index to that of the year
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before. The idea is that, if consumer price index goes up significantly over the
previous year, then it is more likely to have a negative effect on cabinet sup-
port. In Inoguchi (1980), this variable generally shows an anticipated negative
effect on cabinet support, but the significance of its effect seems to depend
highly upon model specifications. This is the only economic variable in my
model simply because there is no monthly income variable (usually measured
by GDP). However, in Inoguchi (1980), yearly data indicated the income vari-
able played a less important role than the price variable in explaining cabinet
support. His research showed that the income variable was no longer signifi-
cant if the price variable was added to the model.
Third, H is included as an independent variable to capture the so-
called “honeymoon effect.” In Japanese politics, the tendency for the cabinet
to have the highest popularity rate in its establishment has long been rec-
ognized. Inoguchi tried to capture this tendency by using the office tenure
length in terms of month, assuming that the longer the tenure, the larger the
depletion of power. However, he found that his tenure variable was not sta-
tistically significant in any model specification. On the other hand, Nishizawa
(2001) was successful in capturing this phenomena by using a dummy variable
that represented the first month of tenure of the cabinet, while he found no
statistical significance of the second or later month dummies.
All political data are drawn from monthly polls of the Jiji Press. The
data were collected from Jiji Press (1981), Jiji Press and Central Research
Services (1992), and Prime Minister’s Office (1992-2002). CPI is available on
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the website of the Japanese Statistics Bureau.3
4.5 Analysis
4.5.1 ARFIMA Filter
I use the ARFIMA (AutoRegressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average)
model to analyze the time series data. By ARFIMA modeling, I remove the
self-explanatory part of the series. ARFIMA modeling allows time series to
be fractionally integrated (0 < I < 1 ), while, in ARIMA (AutoRegressive In-
tegrated Moving Average) modeling, researchers have to decide whether their
data were generated by an I = 0 (stationary) or an I = 1 (nonstationary, i.e.,
unit-root) process. The ARFIMA model is more realistic than the ARIMA
model in that it doesn’t impose on the researcher the dichotomy between
stationary and nonstationary time series. The detailed description and signif-
icance of the concept of fractional dynamics is given in Appendix I.
I estimate ARFIMA(p, d, q) using the modified profile likelihood (MPL).
Table 4.1 presents the estimates of the univariate models. The ARFIMA model
estimate is (0, d, 3) with d = 0.489 for cabinet support, (0, d, 0) with d = .562
for government party support, and (4, d, 2) with d = 1.353 for CPI.4
3http://www.stat.go.jp/data/cpi/200107/zuhyou/a002hh.xls
4I use OX to estimate d. OX is part of the PcGive 9.0 package and is available from
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik/index.html I start from levels and estimate
all (p, d, q) models from (0, d, 0) to (4, d, 4) so that there are up to four AR and four MA
components. In the OX routine, stationarity with d ∈ (−5, 0.4999] is required for all time
series. Therefore if d is very close to the upper bound, I need to take the first difference so
that d − 1 ∈ (−5, 0.4999]. In this case, because the estimate is not d but d − 1, I need to
add 1 to the estimate to obtain d. I estimate d by taking the first difference of government
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Table 4.1 ARFIMA Model Estimates and t-ratios
d (s.e.) t-ratio for d = 0 t-ratio for d = 1 ARMA (p, q)
Cabinet support 0.489 34.929 -36.500 (0, 3)
(0.014)
Gov. party sup. 0.562 15.189 -11.838 (0, 0)
(0.037)
CPI 1.353 35.605 9.289 (4, 2)
(0.038)
The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC)was used to select the best model
from ARFIMA(0, d, 0) to ARFIMA(4, d, 4).
I transform the time series into the white noise residuals of their respec-
tive ARFIMA models to purge autocorrelation and ensure stationarity before
examining the relationship among the series, then run an OLS regression for
the multivariate model of cabinet support. Table 4.2 shows the result. By
modeling the innovation series, I do not expect strong statistical significance
results. In fact, CPI does not show any statistically significant effect on cabi-
net support (this is not necessarily surprising in Japanese politics). However,
I find that both government party support and honeymoon effect have statis-
tically significant effects on cabinet support. The cabinet support increases
as government party support grows, and it benefits from people’s favorable
expectations for the new.
party support and CPI.
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Table 4.2 OLS Estimates of the Equation for Cabinet Support












* p ≤ .01; two tailed test.
t statistics in parentheses.
4.5.2 Moving Chow Test
To test the claim that the significance of LDP support changes over time,
I first conduct a “moving Chow test”(Lin 1999) on the model. The Chow
test is used to examine if a regression model has different intercept and slope
coefficients across two sub-periods, while within each subperiod the parameters
are assumed to be constant.(Chow 1960) The test statistic is
F =
[S3 − (S1 + S2)/k
(S1 + S2)/(N1 + N2 − 2k)
where k is the number of parameters in the regression model; N1 and N2 are
the number of observations for the two subperiods; S1 and S2 are the sum
of squared residuals for the two separate regressions estimated within each
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subperiod: and S3 is the sum of squared residuals for the pooled regression
estimated for the entire period. The statistics follow the F distribution with
degrees of freedom (k, N1 + N2 − 2k). This time, a subperiod consists of 60
consecutive months. First, the period July 1960-June 1965 is compared with
the period July 1965-June 1970. The dividing point is then shifted with a six
month interval; December 1965/January 1966, June 1966/July 1966, Decem-
ber 1966/January 1967, and so on. By using this approach, I can examine the
pattern of change over a continuous period.
Figure 4.2 shows the results of the moving Chow test. Months appearing
below the X axis correspond to dividing points. If the F statistics for each
dividing point are statistically significant (as shown above the dotted line), the
parameter is not constant in two periods before and after the dividing point.
Although most dividing points are statistically significant at the .05 level,
there are two dividing points for which the values are especially high. One is
a dividing point between a five year period from January 1970 to December
1974, and one from January 1975 to December 1979.
This dividing point corresponds to the resignation of prime minister
Kakuei Tanaka due to criticisms against his acceptance of bribes, meaning
that the mechanism of public support for a cabinet has drastically changed
after Tanaka. Another is a dividing point between a period from January 1989
to December 1993, and one from January 1994 to December 1998, which is
just after the collapse of the LDP’s one-party rule and the emergence of the
Hosokawa coalition government.
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Figure 4.2 F Statistics for the Moving Chow Test
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4.5.3 Moving Regression
The Chow test, however, tells us only structural stability, while parameter
instability is our interest. To examine the stability of the effect of LDP sup-
port on cabinet support, I use a moving regression analysis (Brown, Durbin
and Evans 1975; Lin 1999). A subperiod consists of 120 consecutive months.
Shifting the subperiods with a six month interval, I estimates the regression
model. Figure 4.3 shows the moving estimates of β2 , a coefficient associated
with LDP support, and the corresponding 95 percent confidence limits. As
seen in this figure, LDP support has a statistically significant effect on cab-
inet support in every subperiod. However, the strength of the effect varies
across subperiods. It, especially, drops in the 1990s, and becomes statistically
insignificant for last three 120-month periods.
4.5.4 Time-Varying Parameter Regression
As I have seen so far, there is evidence of instability in the effect of LDP
support on cabinet support. However, these tests are problematic in that
their results depend highly on the number of months in each period, and show
only a general pattern. In the moving regression, for example, the effect of
party support on cabinet support looks to be decreasing, given that the last
120-month period provides the lowest value of the estimate. Other period
length, however, may give a different pattern. To examine more strictly how
the effect of government party support on cabinet support changes over time,
I take advantage of time-varying parameter modeling.
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Figure 4.3 Effect of LDP Support on Cabinet Support: Moving Regression
Estimates
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Time varying parameter models assume that a regression parameter
suspected of instability is a function of time. Among classes of such mod-
els, following Lin (1999), I use the mutually orthogonal Legendre polynomial
model.5 In this modeling, the coefficient associated with government party





where z is rescaled time t and β2 (j =1, 2,..., n) are constants to be estimated.
Each polynomial represents the pattern of possible change in a parameter.
For example, the second order polynomial expresses the convex or concave
pattern of the change in a parameter over time. The order of the polynomial
can be determined by theory. However, since there has been no theory about
the possibility of parameter instability before the mid 1980s, I rely on the
empirical evidence already shown above. Looking at Figure 4.3, there seem
to be three or four peaks in the time series of the estimates. Therefore, I
estimate a fifth-order polynomial model. Technical details and the estimation
procedures for this model are given in Appendix II.
Table 4.3 shows a fifth-order polynomial solution for β2. The zero-order
polynomial β2,0 and first-order polynomial β2,1 show statistical significance
at the .01 and .05 level, respectively, while the second-order polynomial β2,2,
5There are many kinds of time varying parameter techniques. For example, Suzuki (1994)
applies the Kalman filtering technique in examining the evolution of voter sophistication in
Japan. Using the dynamic conditional correlation, (Engle 2002) examines the correlation
between the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the NASDAQ composite for ten years of
daily data.
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Table 4.3 Time-Varying Parameter Regression Results






















* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01; two tailed test.
t statistics in parentheses.
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forth-order polynomial β2,4, and fifth-order polynomial β2,5 are only marginally
significant.
Because of parameter instability, however, the statistical significance
of the effect of government support on cabinet support has to be examined
throughout the historical period of interest. For a fifth-order Legendre poly-





is a function of time and can be plotted to show the trajectory of the
estimated effect over the course of history. The variance of the effect at any





Figure 4.4 shows the time path and the 95 percent confidence limits
of the effect of government support represented by the fifth-order solution.
Beginning to decrease in the mid 1980s, the effect of government support on
cabinet support loses its statistical significance from the end of 1993, hits the
bottom in early or mid-1996, and is restored by early 2000.
4.5.5 Bayesian Change Point Model
So far I have examined the changing impact of party support on cabinet sup-
port over time using diagnostic approaches that allows the timing of change
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Figure 4.4 Effect of Party Support on Cabinet Support: Time-Varying Pa-
rameter Regression Estimates (Fifth-Order Polynomial Estimates)
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to be observed. However, searching for change points with diagnostics runs
the risk of mistaking random variation or uncertainty for structural change.
A Bayesian change point model(Western and Kleykamp 2004) treats the
change point in a time series as a parameter to be estimated. In this model,
inference of the regression coefficients reflects prior uncertainty about the loca-
tion of the change point. Inferences about regression coefficients, unconditional
on the change point location, can be obtained by simulation methods.
The effects of causal variables change over time can be modeled with a
dummy variable that takes the value of zero up to the time point marking the
end of the first regime, and the value of one thereafter. Consider a regression
model for the dependent variable, yt, of the form
ŷ = β0 + β1xt + β2It(θ)t + β3Itxt t = 1, ..., T, (4.13)
or equivalently in matrix notation,
ŷ = XθB (4.14)
where the change point indicator It(θ) = 0 for t < θ and It(θ) = 1 for t ≥ θ, y
is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, the matrix Bθ includes
all regressors, and X is a vector of regression coefficients.
Xθ is a function of θ because different change points will yield different
regressors. Assuming that y conditionally follows a normal distribution, the












where the likelihood depends on θ through the regression function in Eq. 4.14.
For a given change point, say θ = k, the likelihood evaluates to L(θ = k|y) ∝∏
t L(θ = k|yt). Here the error variance is written as σ2, but I shall work with
the precision τ = σ−2.
A Bayesian approach makes inferences about the change point and the
coefficients by specifying prior distributions for the parameters. The priors
and the likelihood can be written as follows:
p(τ) = Gamma(n0, s0)
p(B) = N(B0,V0)
p(θ) = (T − 1)−1, θ = 1, ..., T − 1
p(y|Xθ) = N(ŷ, τ−1)
where Gamma(a, b) is a gamma distribution with shape parameter a and ex-
pectation a/b. The prior for θ is a discrete uniform distribution that allocates
equal prior probability to each time point. A noninformative prior for τ sets
n0 and s0 to small positive numbers, say .001. A noninformative prior for the
coefficients sets B0 = 0 and V0 to a diagonal matrix with large prior variances,
say 100.
In estimating this model, full conditional posterior distributions can be
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used to form a Gibbs sampler for posterior simulation. The Gibbs sampler
is a method for Bayesian estimation that simulates draws from the posterior
distribution. To implement the Gibbs sampler, posterior distributions are
specified for each parameter, conditional on all the other parameters in the
model. Sampling from these full conditional posterior distributions ultimately
yields draws from the unconditional posterior distribution (e.g., Gelman et al.
(2003); Lancaster (2004)). Technical details for the Gibbs sampler are given
in Appendix III.
In my analysis, compatible with Eq. 4.13, the shift in cabinet supporting
regimes can be modeled at time t as
Ct = α0 + α1Pt + α2Et + α3Ht
+β0It(θ) + (β1Pt + β2Et + β3Ht)It(θ) + εt (4.16)
where t = July 1960, ..., March 2001, C = cabinet support rate; P = support
rate for government parties (a sum of support rates for all government parties);
E = consumer price index (CPI: the average in 2000=100); H = a dummy
variable indicating the month in which a cabinet started; and the dummy
variable It(θ) = 1 for t ≥ θ and It(θ) = 0 for t < θ. The error, εt, is assumed
to follow a normal distribution.
Result is based on two parallel Gibbs chains of 10,000 iterations after a
burn-in of 1000 iterations with a uniform prior on θ.6 Convergence diagnostics
6This means that I have no assumption on in which year is likely to be a change point, but
I could hold another assumption based on my substantive knowledge on Japanese political
history. For example, I could say, “a change point is more likely to exist from 1989 to 1994,”
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and inspection of the trace plots(Figure 4.5) indicate adequate mixing over
the parameter space.7
Table 4.4 Bayesian Change-point Estimates of the Equation for Cabinet Sup-
port
Bayesian change point estimates
First Second Second regime
Regime Regime net effects
(1) (2) (1) + (2)
Change point (θ) - 400.865(2.878) -
Constant -.028(.260) -.606(.624) -.634(.577)
Gov. party support .965(.093) -.922(.189) .043(.159)
Honeymoon 10.612(1.372) -10.410(2.712) .202(2.319)
CPI -.049(.624) .381(1.546) .332(1.391)
Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept are estimates
of α0 and β0 in Eq. (4.16)
Table 4.4 shows the Bayesian estimates.8 Each Bayesian point estimate
in this table corresponds to the mean of the posterior distribution of the as-
sociated parameter, but it could also be the median or mode. For instance,
the table shows θ is 400.865 with SE = 2.878, but a year with the highest
probability density is 398, as seen in “density of cp” in Figure 4.5.5. Here,
t = 398, which corresponds to August 1993. It is one of beauties of Bayesian
method that we can interpret a change point is most likely to exist at August
1993, while in the classical statistical approach, an estimate of θ is only tested
putting more probabilities on these years.
7R̂ for each estimator is 1.00 (R̂ = 1 at convergence)(Gelman et al. 2003).
8I use WinBUGS(Bayesian inference Using Gibbs Sampling) to estimate the Bayesian
model with the Gibbs sampler. WinBUGS can be accessed from R and is available from
http://http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/. R code for this model is reported in Ap-
pendix IV.
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Figure 4.5 MCMC Trace Plots and Posterior Distributions
Figure 4.5 MCMC Trace Plots and Posterior Distributions (continued)
87
Figure 4.5 MCMC Trace Plots and Posterior Distributions (continued)
Figure 4.5 MCMC Trace Plots and Posterior Distributions (continued)
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against some arbitrary value of θ (say, θ = 400 = October 1993).
The effect of government party support and honeymoon effect on cab-
inet support under the first regime is significantly different from zero (the 95
percent confidence interval is from 0.787 to 1.151 for government party sup-
port, and from 7.744 to 11.482 for honeymoon). Results for the second regime,
however, show that the effects of government party support and honeymoon
have moved in the negative direction. The final column of Table 4.4 shows the
net effects of the predictors in the second regime. Posterior distributions of
these net effects can be calculated directly from the Gibbs output. Summing
iterates of coefficients from the first and second regimes produces draws from
the posterior distribution of the net effects. The net effects suggest that the
coefficients of gvernment party support and honeymoon became insignificant
after the early-1990s.
4.5.6 Discussion
How well do the results from analysises in this chapter fit with the possibility
of instability described earlier? When it comes to the claim of the “presiden-
tialization” that cabinet support became independent of party support after
the mid 1980, there are two points to be discussed. First, a gradual drop in
the effect after this period suggests the influence of the change in the Japanese
media’s methods of reporting political news. Second, however, the decrease
comes too late to be explained by Nakasone’s legacy. In other words, although
there was a big gap between cabinet support rates and LDP support rates un-
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der the Nakasone administration, LDP support still influenced cabinet support
as strongly as under other administrations before Nakasone.
On the other hand, there is room for discussion about the claim of the
“instability of support for new parties”; that weak public loyalty to new parties
causes the decline in the effect of party support on cabinet support under a
coalition government. First, the effect becomes statistically insignificant just
after the establishment of the Hosokawa coalition government at the end of
1993, suggesting that there was a drastic drop in the effect due to the new
parties that participated in the administration.
Under the Murayama coalition government in which the LDP returned
to power, however, the effect still continued to decline despite the LDP sup-
porters, most of whom were relatively loyal. It is not untill early 1996 when the
prime minister changed from Murayama, the Social Democratic Party leader,
to Hashimoto, the LDP leader that the effect began to rise. As discussed in
Section 3.2, this implies that the emergence of new parties is not the only
cause of the parameter instability. There might still be a number of voters
who cared whether a prime minister belongs to their party.
To explore this possibility, I calculate cabinet support rates among dif-
ferent party supporters under the Hosokawa, Murayama and Hashimoto ad-
ministrations using survey data from the Japan Election Study II (JESII).9
As seen in Table 4.5, supporters of the Socialist Party and Sakigake, who con-
9The JES II was conducted by Ikuo Kabashima, Joji Watanuki, Ichiro Miyake, Yoshiaki
Kobayashi, and Ken’ichi Ikeda. This was a seven wave panel study, begun before the House
of Representatives election in 1993, after the House of Councilors Election in July 1995, and
both before and after the House of Representatives election in 1996.
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sisted of about forty percent of all government party supporters, are less likely
to approve of the Hosokawa cabinet’s job performance. Supporters of Koumei,
the Democratic Socialist Party, and the Renewal Party, however, showed the
same level of support for the cabinet as those of the Japan New Party to which
the prime minister belonged. This indicates that whether a favorite party had
the prime minister as a member did not matter under the Hosokawa cabi-
net. On the other hand, under the Murayama administration, supporters of
the Socialist Party to which the prime minister belonged were much more
likely to approve of the cabinet’s job performance than the LDP and Sakigake
supporters who consisted of about seventy percent of all government party
supporters. This implies that the prime minister’s party affiliation did matter
for government party supporters in this case. Moreover, under the Hashimoto
administration, supporters of the LDP, which took over the position of prime
minister from the Socialist Party, were more likely to positively appraise the
cabinet’s job performance than were supporters of the Social Democratic Party
and Sakigake supporters.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter showed that the effect of party support on cabinet support
changed over time, casting a doubt on the findings of previous studies that
party support strongly and constantly influences cabinet support. Krauss
(2002) claimed that since the mid-1980s, when interpretative news stories on
politics began to prevail in the Japanese mass media, the personalities of
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Table 4.5 Approval Rate for Three Coalition Cabinets, Sorted by Party Sup-
port
Hosokawa Cabinet (February 1994)
JSP Koumei DSP RP Sakigake JNP
Approve∗ 67.7% 85.2 87.3 84.4 62.4 85.1
Disapprove 35.3 14.8 12.7 15.6 36.6 13.7
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.2
N 215 81 55 122 101 161
% 29.3 11.0 7.5 16.6 13.7 21.9
Murayama Cabinet (March 1995)
LDP JSP Sakigake
Approve∗ 57.4% 67.4 52.0
Disapprove 42.0 32.6 46.7
Don’t know 0.6 0.0 1.3
N 488 309 75
% 60.0 35.4 8.6
Hashimoto Cabinet (October 1996)
LDP SDP Sakigake
Good∗∗ 44.0% 23.9 31.6
Neutral 45.9 47.9 36.8
Bad 8.7 26.1 31.6
Don’t know 1.3 2.1 0.0
N 815 188 19
% 79.7 18.4 1.9
∗ “Do you approve of the performance of the Hosokawa (Murayama) cabinet
in general?” Answers “Highly approve” and “Approve to some extent” are
combined into “Approve” in the tables while answers “Hardly approve” and
“Do not approve at all” are combined into “Disapprove.” No neutral answer
choice is provided.
∗∗ “What do you think of the performance of the Hashimoto cabinet in general
so far?” Answers “Very good” and “Good” are combined into “Good” in the




prime ministers have had a strong influence on voters’ attitudes toward the
cabinet, and the resultant effects of party support on cabinet support had
declined. I generally confirmed this tendency through the time-varying pa-
rameter analysis, but no decreasing trend was observed during the term of the
most representative “presidential” prime minister in Japan Nakasone.
On the other hand, the pattern of a decline suggested by the “instability
of support for new parties” was observed during the Hosokawa and Hata ad-
ministrations. This was, however, not necessarily true during the Murayama
and Hashimoto administrations. The existence of the new party did not ex-
plain a decline under the Murayama administration that included only Saki-
gake, the smallest new party. It also did not account for a increase under the
Hashimoto administration, whose only difference from the Murayama admin-
istration was the party affiliation of prime minister. In this case, the more
important factor in explaining the changing impact of party support on cab-
inet support was whether prime minister belonged to the party that had the
biggest supporter group within a body of all government supporters.
Based on these findings, the following implications are proposed for
further research in Japanese politics. First, as it is no longer valid to assume
that the parameters associated with party support are stable over time under
the coalition governments of the 1990s, researchers should not include the data
from this time period when using usual time series analysis methods. Special
treatment should be necessary if time-series models that are similar to those
in Inoguchi (1980) and Nishizawa (2001) are examined for the period of the
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coalition governments. Second, the findings confirm the claim of Kabashima
(1998) that it is problematic to consider party support for the new parties as
an ultimate independent variable in the model of Japanese political behavior.
There should be a distinction between supportive attitudes toward new and
existing parties in this type of analysis.
These findings, however, still leave unanswered the questions of why
the effect of party support on cabinet support increases or decreases over time.
Although this chapter suggested that the pattern of change could be consistent
with two possibilities, the causal mechanism is still unclear. The next chapter
examines the determinants of the effect of party support on cabinet support
in detail, including the impact of the prime minister’s party affiliation.
Appendix I: A Transfer Function Model Using
Fractional Integration Technique
In analyzing time series data, Box and Jenkins ARIMA techniques (Box and
Jenkins 1970) have been used to purge autocorrelation which researchers may
suffer from when using familiar OLS regression procedures. However, ARIMA
techniques are restrictive in that they require researchers to decide whether
their data were generated by an I = 0 (stationary) or an I = 1 (nonstationary,
i.e., unit-root) process. Based on this decision, researchers have to either
difference their data (if they believe that it is nonstationary) or leave it in
level form (if they believe that it is stationary). This decision has serious
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analytic and theoretical consequences.
Theoretically, classifying a variable as stationary implies that its value
at previous periods is forgotten at a consistent rate as it tends toward some
long-term mean. But, classifying a variable as having a unit-root implies that
it has the properties of a “random walk.” Such a series has “perfect memory”
in the sense that its value at any time t is the same as its value at the precious
period, t − 1 , plus any shock incurred at time t.
Analytically, treating it as a unit-root process leads the researcher to
transform it through the process of “first differencing,” i.e., generating a new
series based on differences between the value of the series at consecutive time
points. However, this transformation is significant because it prohibits the re-
searcher from identifying any long-term relationships that might exist between
the differenced variable and other variables in the model. On the other hand,
leaving a variable in level form avoids this problem but can have negative con-
sequences if the data generating process possesses some degree of long-memory.
Especially, spurious regression -finding a significant relationship between vari-
ables when none truly exists- is a likely result when variables with some degree
of persistence are left in level form.
The concept of fractional dynamics enables researchers to avoid this
restrictive stationary versus nonstationary dichotomy (for political application,
see Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1998); Lebo, Walker and Clarke (2000); Box-
Steffensmeier and Tomlison (2000), Clarke and Lebo (2003)). In this concept,
researchers do not have to have the assumption that time series variables
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must be either stationary process or random walks, and allow time series to be
fractionally integrated ( 0 < I < 1). In ARIMA notation, the data generating
process of series X can be written as follows:
ϕ(L)(1 − L)dXt = θ(L)εt and εt ∼ N(0, σ2)
where L is a backshift operator such that Lkεt = εt−k , ϕ(L) represents a
stationary autoregressive process, θ(L) represents a stationary moving-average
process, and the degree of integration of X is measured by the fractional
differencing parameter, d.
Appendix II: Time-Varying Parameter Regres-
sion
For time-series regression
Yt = β1 + β2X2t + βkXkt + ut, t = 1, 2, ..., T
Lin (1999) uses a time-varying parameter, βi, suggested in Hinich and Roll





where Pj(z(t)) are the Legendre polynomials (see Table 4.6; n is the
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highest order of the polynomials; and βi,j, (j = 1, 2, ..., n) are fixed parameters.
The reason for using the Legendre polynomials in this specification is that
they are mutually orthogonal in the interval [-1, 1] and therefore lack high
collinearity. To ensure orthogonality, t, (t = 1, 2, .., T ) has to be rescaled into
z(t) = [2(t− 1)/(T − 1)]− 1 ∈ [−1, 1]. For example, from July 1960 to March
2003 (with T = 489),
z(t) = [2(t − 1)/(489 − 1)] − 1.








Since P (z)Xit can be evaluated with empirical data, the regression is
still linear in the parameters ( βi,j ) and hence can be estimated by usual
methods.








4 − 30z2 + 3)/8
P5(z) = (63z
5 − 70z3 + 15z)/8
Source: Calculated from Rodrigue’s Formula:
Pn(z) = (−1)n/22n!)(dn/dzn){(1 − z2)n}.
See Beyer (1984, p.372).
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Appendix III: Gibbs Sampler
The Gibbs sampler begins by setting initial values of the change point, the
precision, and the regression coefficient. The sampler randomly draws one of
these parameters − written θ∗, τ ∗, and B∗ − conditional on values for others:
1. Draw the precision τ ∗ from Gamma(n0 + n/2, s0 + SS
∗/2), where the
current value of the sums of squares SS∗ =
∑
e∗t , and e
∗
t = yt − x′θ∗t β
∗.
2. Draw the vector of regression coefficients from the multivariate normal
distribution N(B1,V1) with mean vector B1 = V1(V0B0 + τ
∗X′θ∗ ∗ y),


















, is evaluated at each time point θ = 1, ..., T −1 using
current values of the parameters B∗ and τ ∗.
The algorithm is termed a blocked Gibbs sampler, because step 2 updates the
block of all coefficient under all the change points. The Gibbs sampler can also
accommodate a more general model in which a regression with no change point
is included a priori. For this covariate xt, setting coefficients β2 = β3 = 0.
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Appendix III: R Code for the Bayesian Change
Point Analysis of Japanese Data





y <- Dependent variable in matrix form






data <- list("N", "y", "x", "p", "yr", "punif", "T")
in1 <- list(alpha = c(0,0,0), beta = c(0,0,0), alpha0 = 0, beta0=0, cp
= 40, tau = 1)
in2 <- list(alpha = c(1,1,1), beta = c(1,1,1), alpha0 = 1, beta0=1, cp
= 80, tau = 1)
inits <- list(in1,in2)
parameters <- c("alpha", "beta", "alpha0", "beta0", "cp", "tau")
result.sim <- bugs(data, inits, parameters, model.file="changepoint5.bug",
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n.chains = 2, n.iter = 10000, n.burnin=1000, debug=FALSE, bugs.directory







WinBugs Code for the Bayesian Change Point
Analysis of Japanese Data(“changepoint5.bug”
appearing in the R code)





for(i in 1:N) {
y[i] dnorm(mu[i], tau)
mu[i] <- alpha0 + inprod(alpha[],x[i,]) + beta0*J[i]
+ J[i]*inprod(beta[],x[i,])
100
J[i] <- step(yr[i] - cp - 0.5)
}














The Determinants of the Effect
of Party Support on Cabinet
Support
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the determinants of the effect of party support on
cabinet support. While researchers have long suggested the strong influence of
party support on voters’ appraisal of the cabinet’s job performance, Chapter
3 showed with time-varying parameter modeling that the influence was not
constant over time, especially under the coalition governments of the 1990s.
Why, then, was the parameter instability observed for this period? More
generally, what were the determinants of the effect of party support on cabinet
support? This chapter answers this question by testing two hypotheses with
panel survey data drawn from Japan Election Study II, 1993-1996.
Section 2 specifies the question by theoretically considering the mean-
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ing of the effect of party support on cabinet support. Section 3 proposes two
hypotheses based on theoretical consideration. Section 4 illustrates the idea
of one of these hypotheses using EITM (Empirical Implications of Theoretical
Models) approach with empirical data. Section 5 tests these hypotheses, ana-
lyzing the survey data with two models, one static and one dynamic. Section
5 draws conclusions.
5.2 Questions
In the context of a time-series analysis, the effect of party support on cabinet
support represents “sensitivity” of cabinet support rates to government party
support rates. In other words, it tells us how much a cabinet support rate
changes corresponding to the change in government support rates. So what
determines the magnitude of the sensitivity?
5.2.1 Party Support as a Determinant of Cabinet Sup-
port
As a theoretical foundation of the hypotheses proposed in a later section, I
first consider how a change in an individual level relates to one in an aggregate
level in the context of party support and cabinet support. More specifically,
the questions are: Why does party support influence cabinet support, and
when does the influence change?
In Japanese politics, party support has been considered the most impor-
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tant political attitude (Miyake 1985). Miyake (1998) explains party support
by referring to the concept of party identification developed in the United
States. Party identification is “the individual’s orientation to an important
group-object in his environment” that works as “a perceptual screen” through
which people interpret politics (Campbell et al. 1960, p.121). It is considered
as an emotional attachment to a political party rather than a rational eval-
uation of it. The level of political knowledge of voters is generally very low
(Converse 1964; Bennett 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and therefore
voters heavily rely on party identification when casting a ballot. Such parti-
sanship makes voters favor an administration in which their party takes part,
sometimes regardless of its performance. In other words, even a cabinet that
shows a poor performance can achieve popularity among partisans because of
emotional attachment to their party.
To explain the effect of party support on cabinet support, there are two
possible determinants. The first is the strength of voters’ emotional attach-
ment to their party. If supporters of a government party tend to approve of
the performance of a cabinet in which their party takes part, the degree of
emotional attachment to their party should influence how much they support
the cabinet. Therefore, the effect is lower among voters who have a weaker
emotional attachment to their party.
Second, the “ownership” of a cabinet should be an important factor in
determining the effect. The question is how strongly people associate their
party with the cabinet. Given the emotional attachment to the party, the
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effect of party support on cabinet support emerges when the “projection” of
a party onto a cabinet is possible. In other words, as the party is perceived to
be the same entity as the cabinet, voters feel the same emotional attachment
to the party as to the cabinet. Therefore, the effect is lower among voters who
have difficulty relating the party to the cabinet in their minds.
Theoretically, the change in the effect of party support on cabinet sup-
port on an individual level leads to a change on an aggregate level in the
following way. First, if the government party has supporters who are loyal to
their party and associate the cabinet with the party (like the LDP supporters
under the “1955 party system”) cabinet support rates will be stable, anchored
by party support. In this case, regardless of events such as the failure in public
policy, or political scandals, cabinet support rates will not fluctuate very much
as long as the party support rates are stable. On the other hand, if voters de-
cide whether to support the cabinet based only on their rational evaluation
of the cabinet’s job performance, the cabinet support rates will fluctuate very
much, influenced by these events. In addition, if LDP support has great sig-
nificance in forming other political attitudes, those who stop supporting the
LDP are likely to lower their cabinet support level as well.
Therefore, when a change in the LDP support rates leads to a cabinet
support rate change, the effect of LDP support on cabinet support emerges at
an aggregate level. In this sense, the support rates of the LDP cabinets under
the “1955 party system” had a “firm” base of voters’ LDP support.
Moreover, the number of supporters with a strong emotional attachment
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to a party is important. Although the LDP cabinet had a firm party support
base, in the sense that the LDP supporters consistently support the cabinet;
if there were not many such supporters, the effect would have be smaller.
Defining the proportion of government supporters within a body of all voters
as the “size” of the cabinet support’s base, the LDP-lead cabinets had a “large”
base of voter support for the LDP.
Using these concepts, I argue that when cabinet support has a “firm”
and “large” base of party support, or when there are many government party
supporters who approve of the cabinet’s job performance, based on an emo-
tional attachment to the party, the effect of party support on cabinet support
should be large. On the contrary, when cabinet support has only a “soft” and
“small” base of party support, or when there are a few government supporters
who have an emotional attachment to the party, the effect should be small.
In other words, a “firm” base corresponds to a supporter’s strong emotional
attachment to the party, and a “large” base refers to a number of supporters
who relate the cabinet to the party in their mind.
5.3 Hypotheses
This section proposes two testable hypotheses based on theoretical consider-
ations of the effect of party support on cabinet support discussed in the last
section.
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5.3.1 Instability of support for new parties
Partisanship grows as a product of political experience and learning (Campbell
et al. 1960). Participation in political processes, especially elections, helps
people form political preferences, which can eventually grow into partisanship.
By knowing what a party has done, voters can set their expectations for the
party’s future behavior. Through these expectations, they can acquire loyalty
that is resistant to the parties’ temporary failures.
New parties, however, cannot have such loyal voters with strong par-
tisanship. In fact, Kabashima (1998) and Miyake (1983) showed that voters’
support for the Renewal Party, the Japan New Party, and Sakigake, which
emerged onto the Japanese political scene in the early 1990s, was instable and
easily changeable. The influence of new party support on political perception
and candidate evaluation was weak, and party labels did not play an impor-
tant role in helping voters form their political attitudes (Watanuki and Miyake
1997).
The decline in the effect of party support can also be observed in voters’
appraisal of the cabinet’s job performance. Like independent voters, support-
ers of the new parties had not obtained strong partisanship as an emotional
attachment to the party yet, and therefore tended to rely more heavily on
rational rather than emotional judgements. In this sense, “support for new
parties” has no significance, and the support rates for the new parties are not
strongly related to the cabinet support rates.
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5.3.2 Discrepancy between Party and Cabinet in the
Public Mind
Under the 1955 party system, in which the LDP had been only a ruling party
and the number of political parties were almost fixed, voters could perceive that
the government was equivalent to the LDP. As a result, support for the LDP
was directly converted to cabinet support. Under coalition governments that
consisted of multiple parties, however, this relationship was rarely established.
Voters had more difficulty forming a perception that their favorite party is
equivalent to the cabinet under a coalition government than under the LDP’s
one-party rule. When the party is not associated with the cabinet, even if
voters are strongly emotionally attached to the party, they do not favor the
cabinet more than independent voters do.
Such discrepancy between party and cabinet in voters’ minds stems from
the degree to which the cabinet’s policies reflect the ideas of the party, and
how much the party executes leadership in the cabinet. One consideration is
whether the prime minister belongs to the party. The party affiliation of prime
minister can be an important “cue” for the general public to know who owns
the cabinet. Supporters of a government party to which the prime minister
belongs are more likely to evaluate the cabinet’s performance based on their
emotional attachment to the party. Thus, the more supporters of a ruling
party who associate the party with the cabinet, the stronger the relationship
between the ruling party support rate and the cabinet support rate.
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5.3.3 Explanation of the Change in the Effect of Party
Support on Cabinet Support in the 1990s, Based
on these Hypotheses
Using these two hypotheses, I then explain the change in the effect of party
support on cabinet support in the 1990s. First, the effect declined drastically
late in 1993 because the new party supporters had not obtained emotional
attachment to their party yet. Although the supporters of the existing parties
joining the Hosokawa coalition government might show their partisanship when
appraising the cabinet, they were not enough the supporters to compensate
the lesser loyalty of new parties’ supporters. In other words, the effect declined
as there was a “small” and “soft” base of party support.
This decline continued in the Murayama cabinet as the LDP supporters
distinguished between their party and the cabinet due to prime minister who
belonged to the JSP. Supporters of the JSP, on the other hand, tended to
positively evaluate the cabinet, but the number was still small. The effect
declined because there was a “hard” but “small” base of party support in the
Murayama administration.
Finally, the recovery in the effect under the Hashimoto administration
could be explained by LDP leader Hashimoto’s rise to premiership. Both the
strong emotional attachment to the LDP and the large proportion of LDP
supporters among the ruling parties’ supporters gave the cabinet a “hard”
and “large” base of party support.
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5.4 Analysis
This section examine two models using panel data from Japan Election Study
II (JESII). The first model is static, and designed to explore how party support
influences the appraisal of the cabinet’s job performance under each adminis-
tration. The second model is dynamic and designed to verify how the changes
in party support and cabinet support are related, taking advantage of the
JESII panel data.
5.4.1 The Effect of Party Support on Cabinet Support
In the static model, the dependent variable is the appraisal of the cabinet’s
general job performance. The JESII asked respondents about their evalua-
tion of the cabinet’s job performance on a 5 point scale for the Miyazawa and
Hashimoto cabinets, and on a 4 point scale for the Hosokawa and Murayama
cabinets, with higher values indicating higher evaluations. There are concep-
tually six kinds of independent variables. The first three are controls of social
status -sex, age, and education. Sex is coded 0 for male and 1 for female, ed-
ucation is scored according to a 4 point scale from 1 for “high school, former
elementary school, or former senior elementary school”1 to 4 for “college or
graduate school.”
As variables capturing a voters’ rational evaluation of the cabinet’s job
performance, I include the appraisals of the cabinet’s job performance in han-
dling of political reform issues and the economy. Measured by slightly different
1The “former” schools are those existing in the old school system before 1945.
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wordings and in different contexts in each wave of the panel study (such as
“administrative reform” and “political reform” for political issues, and “dereg-
ulation” and “yen appreciation” for economic issues), these variables are scored
on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 (the Miyazawa and Hashimoto cabinets), or 1 to
4 (the Hosokawa and Murayama cabinets), with higher values denoting higher
evaluations. I, however, do not use these variables themselves, because there
is a possibility that the general and specific appraisals of the cabinet’s job
performance influence each other. In other words, voters may not be able to
distinguish between specific and general evaluations, and those who approve of
the cabinet’s overall performance may be biased toward positive evaluations of
the cabinet’s job performance in specific issues. If I ignore such simultaneity,
the OLS estimator is no longer consistent.
To deal with this problem, I use political satisfaction and perception
of the economy as instrumental variables for the evaluations of political and
economic issues, respectively. Because no question adressing perception of
the economy is available in the survey conducted in February 1994 during the
Hosokawa administration, I use the variable in the survey conducted in August
1993.
Finally, the independent variable of interest is party support, which is a
dummy variable for each party supporter group. “LDP support,” for example,
is coded 1 for LDP supporters, and 0 for otherwise. Because the reference cat-
egory is “independent voters,” I can see how positively or negatively partisans
appraised the cabinet’s general job performance compared to independents.
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Table 5.1: Determinants of Cabinet Support: Static
Model
Miyazawa (Jul. 1993) Hosokawa (Feb. 1994)
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant -.373 .199 -.035 .936
Sex .059 .077 .-.082 .008
Age .003 .010 .004 .001
Education -.007 .728 .027 .102
Political Evaluation .743 000 .888 .000
Economic Evaluation .477 .000 .095 .640
Party Support
LDP .155 .001 -.192 .000
JSP -.097 .099 -.010 .856
Koumei -.167 .041 .320 .000
DSP -.018 .872 .161 .079
JCP -.286 .004 -.419 .000
SDL -.095 .556 .162 .012
RP -.067 .446 -.028 .689
Sakigake -.203 .247 .285 .000
JNP -.113 .189 .192 .573
N 1725 1562
Adj − R2 .175 .175
Murayama (Jul. 1995) Hashimoto (Oct. 1996)
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant -.194 .326 .428 .119
Sex -.001 .986 .-.078 .035
Age .004 .001 .002 .117
Education -.016 .311 -.009 .643
Political Evaluation .766 000 .673 .000
Economic Evaluation .400 .000 .319 .001
Party Support
LDP .112 .002 .390 .000
NFP -.336 .000 -.214 .001
JSP(SDP) .300 .000 .013 .852
Sakigake .151 .108 .104 .570
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JCP -.366 .000 -.573 .000
DP - - .026 .744
N 1848 1696
Adj − R2 .220 .231
Table 5.1 shows the OLS estimation results for each administration.
First, for the Miyazawa administration, age, appraisals of the political and
economic performance, LDP support, Koumei support, and JCP support have
a statistically significant effect on cabinet support at the 5 percent level. This
indicates that there was a tendency to support the cabinet for older voters
and those who positively evaluate the cabinet’s political and economic job
performance. Controlling for these evaluations of the cabinet’s performance,
the LDP supporters were still more likely, and Koumei and JCP supporters
were less likely to positively appraise the performance. No effect of party sup-
port was observed among the JSP, DSP, SDL, RP, and Sakigake supporters.
These opposition party supporters appraised the cabinet’s general job perfor-
mance based mainly on an evaluation of the cabinet’s political and economic
job performance, without any partisan bias. This pattern in the effect of party
support could reflect the difference among new and existing party supporters
in their loyalty to their parties. Thus, the Miyazawa administration had a
relatively “hard” base of LDP support.
Second, sex, age, appraisal of the cabinet’s political and economic job
performance, and support for the LDP, Koumei, the JCP, the SDL, and Saki-
gake show a statistically significant effect on support for the Hosokawa cabinet
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at the 5 percent level. Contrasting with the case of the Miyazawa adminis-
tration, young and female voters tended to positively evaluate the general job
performance of the Hosokawa cabinet. While the appraisal of the cabinet’s po-
litical and economic job performance mattered, voters did not care about the
economy in evaluating the cabinet’s general job performance. This suggests
that unlike other cabinets, the Hosokawa cabinet was supported only for its
political reform effort.
Controlling for the specific job evaluations, party support had an influ-
ence on cabinet support among supporters of the LDP, Koumei, and the JCP
who were considered relatively loyal to their party. Only the Sakigake sup-
porters were not likely to positively evaluate the cabinet. Although the JNP
and the RP played a central role in the administration, their supporters based
their evaluations of the cabinet job performance on a rational ground. The
Hosokawa administration had a “small” base of support, as the proportion of
Koumei and Sakigake supporters was only 24.7 percent among all government
party supporters.
Third, age, appraisal of the cabinet’s political and economic job perfor-
mance, support for the LDP, the NFP, the JSP, and the JCP show a statisti-
cally significant effect on support for the Murayama cabinet at the 5 percent
level. Older voters tended to positively evaluate the cabinet’s job performance,
and both political and economic job performance of the cabinet mattered for
voters. Support for The LDP and the JCP was also a powerful predictor of
cabinet support although they showed opposite trends. It is especially notable
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that NFP supporters were less likely to support the coalition government of
the LDP, the JSP, and Sakigake than were independents, given that most new
party supporters did not rely on partisanship when evaluating the Miyazawa
and Hosokawa administrations. This may suggest that the label of the new
party was established three years after their emergence when the new party
partisanship began to work as a “perceptual screen” through which voters saw
politics.
It is also notable that support for the JSP was related to a positive
attitude toward the Murayama cabinet, while JSP supporters did not base
their evaluation on a partisan ground for the Miyazawa administration, or even
the Hosokawa administration that the JSP joined. This implies that the JSP
leader, Murayama’s assumption of premiership made JSP supporters happy
enough to be generous in their evaluations. LDP support was, however, not as
important in predicting cabinet support under the Murayama administration
as it was under the other administrations in which the LDP took part. The
proportion of JSP supporters to all government party supporters was only 18.4
percent, indicating that the Murayama cabinet had a “large” but “soft” base
of party support.
Finally, age, appraisals of the cabinet economic and political perfor-
mance, support for the LDP, the RP, and the JCP have a statistically signifi-
cant effect onsupport for the Hashimoto administration at the 5 percent level.
Again, the LDP and JCP supporters showed strong but opposite attitudes to-
ward the Hashimoto cabinet’s performance. When including the results from
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the former three cabinets, the supporters for these two parties were relatively
strong partisans. The RP supporters also showed that their partisanship was
comparable with that of the existing party supporters, as they negatively eval-
uated the Hashimoto cabinet as well as the Murayama cabinet. Contrasting
with the case of the Murayama cabinet, the SDP (JSP) supporters were no
longer generous evaluators, without their partisan bias in evaluating the cab-
inet’s job performance. Party affiliation of the prime minister really mattered
for the DSP (JSP) supporters.
5.4.2 Discussion
From what I have found so far, I draw the following inferences on the change in
the effect of party support on cabinet support in the 1990s. First, as the anal-
ysis of the determinants of cabinet support under the Miyazawa and Hosokawa
administrations demonstrated, voters’ support for two newly established par-
ties, the JNP and the RP, that played a central role in establishing the first
coalition government in the 1990s, had no impact on cabinet support. In other
words, the cabinet could not expect any favor from these supporters. Sakigake
supporters tended to positively evaluate the Hosokawa cabinet’s performance,
but the number of them was probably not large enough to enhance the rela-
tionship between government party support and cabinet support. The analysis
also revealed that the performance of the Hosokawa cabinet was evaluated only
through its political reform agendas, and benefited from the partisanship of
the supporters of small parties such as Koumei, the SDL, and Sakigake. Thus,
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the effect of party support on cabinet support declined under the Hosokawa
administration.
Second, I compared the determinants of cabinet support under the Mu-
rayama and Hashimoto administrations, and found that the party affiliation
of the prime minister mattered for both LDP and JSP supporters. While JSP
supporters did not tend to show support for the Hosokawa and Hashimoto
administrations that the JSP joined, they did favor the Murayama admin-
istration, whose prime minister belonged to the JSP. LDP supporters also
positively evaluated the cabinet in which the prime minister was their leader.
Thus, the effect of party support on cabinet support was restored due to the
assumption of premiership by the leader of the party whose supporters com-
prised the majority of all government party supporters.
5.4.3 The Effect of Party Support Change on Cabinet
Support Change
In the analysis of the determinants of cabinet support, I found that there was
much variation in the effect of party support on cabinet support across sup-
porter groups. The static model, however, does not tell us how the change in
party support is related to the change in cabinet support. In time-series anal-
ysis, there is an assumption on an individual level that one attitude change
leads to another attitude change, which is testable only with panel data. Tak-
ing advantage of the JESII panel data, this section examines the dynamic
relationship between party support and cabinet support on an individual level.
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In the dynamic model, the dependent variable is the change in the eval-
uation of the cabinet’s general job performance, to which value is assigned by
subtracting past evaluation values from current ones. For example, respon-
dents who appraise the cabinet’s job performance most negatively at a past
time and most positively at a current time is given “3” (“4 - 1”) on a 4-point
scale. Larger shifts toward the value of the positive end lead to higher values.
The independent variables are the changes in the evaluations of the cab-
inet’s political and economic job performance, and the changes in party sup-
port. The evaluation of the cabinet’s political and economic job performance
is denoted in the same way for the general job evaluation. The change in party
support is a dummy variable which captures the pattern of change across three
types of party support, such as “government party support to opposition party
support,” “opposition party support to opposition party”(actually no change),
and “independent to government party support.” As the reference category
is “independent to independent,” I examine how respondents who changed
their party support alter their evaluation of the cabinet’s job performance in
a comparison with consistent independents over two time periods. Moreover,
in Model 2, I further categorize the changes in party support with an exist-
ing/new party dichotomy; for example, “new government party support to
existing opposition party support.”
Although the JESII is panel data, wording of certain questions and vari-
able measurement varies from wave to wave. The variables for the evaluation
of the cabinet’s job performance, for example, are coded from 1 to 5 including
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a neutral category, for the Miyazawa and Hashimoto administrations, but 1 to
4, not including a neutral category, for the Hosokawa and Murayama adminis-
trations. Because of this coding difference, a simple subtraction is impossible
for the variables that are coded on different scales. It is, however, not jus-
tifiable to assume that some categories on a 4-point scale are equivalent to
a neutral category on a 5-point scale. Therefore, only the change in voters’
attitudes between the Hosokawa and Murayama administrations that have the
same coding scheme and are chronologically next to each other are examined
in the dynamic model.
I make the following theoretical predictions: First, when there is no
change in party support (in the sense that voters consistently support for
one of ruling or opposition parties), there will be no resultant change in the
evaluation of the cabinet’s job performance. Second, a change from either
ruling party support or independent identification to opposition party support
will have a negative effect on the evaluation. Third, a change from either
opposition party support or independent identification to ruling party support
will have a positive effect on the evaluation.
In addition, the “instability of new party support” hypothesis expects
a support change from one new party to another to have a less impact on the
evaluation than a support change from one existing party to another. This
prediction is, however, empirically ambiguous, because the effect of support
for the RP is significant, as seen in Table 5.1.
It should also be noted that the subcategory “existing party support
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to existing party support” within the category “government party support to
government party support” indicates consistent support for the JSP (SDP).
If the party affiliation of the prime minister matters, the effect of party sup-
port on cabinet support will be strengthened by the assumption by the JSP
leader Murayama’s assumption to premiership among these supporters. More-
over, the category “existing party support to existing party support” within
“opposition party support to government party support” indicates consistent
support for the LDP (because the LDP was an opposition party under the
Hosokawa administration, and a ruling party under the Murayama adminis-
tration). This change is expected to have a positive effect on the change in
the evaluation of the cabinet’s job performance.
Table 5.3: Determinants of Cabinet Support: Dynamic
Models (Hosokawa, Feb. 1994 → Murayama, Jul. 1995)
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant .730 .000 .686 .000
∆ Political Evaluation .215 .151 .228 .128
∆ Economic Evaluation .400 .000 .319 .001
∆Party Support
Gov. Party → Gov. Party -.022 .816
New Party → New Party -.305 .157
Existing Party → Existing Party .057 .587
New Party → Existing Party .103 .483
Existing Party → New Party -.272 .461
Gov. Party → Op. Party -.698 .000
New Party → New Party -.548 .000
Existing Party → Existing Party .169 .546
New Party → Existing Party -.787 .173
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Existing Party → New Party -.827 .000
Op. Party → Gov. Party .300 .001
New Party → New Party - -
Existing Party → Existing Party .315 .000
New Party → Existing Party - -
Existing Party → New Party -.524 .204
Op. Party → Op. Party -.045 .818
New Party → New Party - -
Existing Party → Existing Party .211 .301
New Party → Existing Party - -
Existing Party → New Party -.236 .207
Gov. Party → Independent -.165 .124
New Party → Independent -.159 .234
Existing Party → Independent -.169 .193
Op. Party → Independent .045 .726
New Party → Independent - -
Existing Party → Independent .045 .723
Independent → Gov. Party .087 .452
Independent → New Party -.275 .352
Independent → Existing Party .130 .274
Independent → Op. Party -.459 .002
Independent → New Party -.415 .005
Independent → Existing Party -1.046 .028
N 1054 1054
Adj − R2 .194 .208
Table 5.3 shows the OLS estimation results of the dynamic model. In
Model 1, the changes from “government party support to opposition party
support,” from “opposition party support to government party support,” and
from “independent to opposition party support” had a statistically significant
and expected effect on the evaluation of the cabinet’s job performance.
In Model 2, the change from “new party support to new party support”
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within the category “government party support to opposition party support”
had a statistically significant negative effect, which suggests that supporters
of the JNP, the RP, or Sakigake in the Hosokawa administration appraised the
Murayama administration less positively by becoming supporters of the NFP.2
The change from “existing party support to new party support” in the same
category also showed a negative impact, which indicates that supporters of the
JSP, the DSP, the JCP, and the SDL in the Hosokawa administration lowered
their evaluation of the Murayama cabinet after becoming NFP supporters.
The change from “existing party support to existing party support” within
the category of “opposition party support to ruling party support” had a
statistically significant and positive effect at the 5 percent level, which suggests
that voters who continued to support the LDP evaluated the performance of
the Hosokawa cabinet better than that of the Murayama cabinet.
Finally, the significant negative effect of the changes from “indepen-
dent to new party support” and from “independent to existing party support”
within the category of “independent to opposition party support” indicates
that independents lowered their evaluations of the cabinet’s job performance
by becoming NFP or JCP supporters.
What is surprising is the strong partisanship of NFP supporters. Sup-
port for the NFP had more significant meaning than that for the other newly
established parties, such as the JNP, the RP, and Sakigake. In other words, the
partisanship of NFP supporters was strong enough to be a “perceptual screen”
2The NFP was established by a merger of several parties including the JNP, the RP, and
Sakigake.
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through which voters saw the cabinet. It is also notable that voters who con-
sistently supported the SDP for these two periods, or those who became JSP
supporters during the Murayama administration did not raise their evalua-
tions of the cabinet’s job performance, although the effect of JSP support on
cabinet support actually increased as seen in Table 5.1. This was probably
due to independent voters who evaluated the cabinet under the Murayama
administration less positively than under the Hosokawa administration.
5.5 Conclusion
I summarize the findings in this chapter as follows:
1. The effect of party support on cabinet support declined under the Hosokawa
administration because the supporters of the JNP and the RP did not
base their evaluations of the cabinet’s job performance on their affective
attachment to their parties (from a comparison between the Miyazawa
and Hosokawa administrations in Table 5.1). Among the existing party
supporters, Koumei supporters evaluated the Hosokawa cabinet’s job
performance more positively, but their proportion was not large enough
to keep the effect.
2. The effect of party support on cabinet support dropped under the Mu-
rayama administration because the LDP supporters, who had no prime
minister in the cabinet, did not strongly support the Murayama cabinet
(from an analysis in Table 5.1). In addition, although the JSP support-
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ers, who had the prime minister, tended to support the cabinet, their
proportion among all government party supporters was not large.
3. The effect was restored under the Hashimoto administration because
the prime minister was the LDP party leader, and a large body of the
LDP supporters strongly supported the cabinet (from an analysis of the
Hashimoto administration in Table 5.1).
4. Partisan effect of the newly established parties in 1993 was weak, but
that of the NFP, established three years later, was as strong as that of
the existing parties (from an analysis in Table 5.3).
I examined the determinants of the effect of party support on other political
attitudes from a theoretical view-point, and came to the following conclusions.
First, when voters have a clear image of a political party, and when the party
exists long enough for the voters to form an affective attachment to it, the effect
of party support on cabinet support is strengthened. Second, as the extent to
which voters associate the party with another political actor, such as a cabinet,
increases, party support becomes more influential. Although these arguments
cannot be simply generalized for other political attitudes than cabinet support,




Political observers have written countless books on why the LDP man-
aged to stay in power for so long despite its corrupted nature. In this dis-
sertation, I examined the mechanism of cabinet support in Japanese people’s
minds, and explored when and why it changed.
Chapter 2 showed that the logic of cabinet support had changed since
the 1955 party system collapsed in the early 1990s. Under the 1955 party
system, people’s support for the LDP was closely tied with support for the
cabinet because of ideology and trust in the LDP’s ability to govern. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the influence of ideology on citizens’
political attitudes declined, while new conservative parties provided people
with new realistic alternatives to the LDP. These changes in citizens’ mind
finally lead to the end of the LDP’s one-party dominant regime in 1993.
Using the VAR approach, Chapter 3 examined the effect of party sup-
port on cabinet support to provide a basis for analyses of the changing effect
in later chapters. More specifically, it investigated how cabinet support, party
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support, and the economy influence each other, and found that Japanese data
confirmed no causality from cabinet support to party support while party sup-
port did affect cabinet support.
Chapter 4 investigated the changing effect of party support on cabi-
net support, conducting a time series analysis of data drawn from monthly
polls taken by Jiji Press, 1960-2001. First, using the idea of EITM (Empir-
ical Implications of Theoretical Models) to combine both formal theory and
statistical analysis, I constructed a theoretical model of cabinet support, and
drew an empirical implication about the changing effect of party support on
cabinet support. In the model, I showed the mechanism by which partisan
loyalty was transformed into the effect of party support on cabinet support,
using the AR(1) process as an “analogue” of partisan loyalty or persistence
of party support. The implication was that when the persistence of support
rates for existing parties is stronger than that of support rates for new parties,
the effect of party support on cabinet support decreases as the proportion of
new party supporters who support the cabinet within a body of all cabinet
supporters increases. I illustrated this idea with time series data drawn from
the monthly polls conducted by Jiji Pres.
Second, I empirically demonstrated the changing effect of party support
on cabinet support over time, using ARFIMA (autoregressive fractionally inte-
grated moving average) modeling as well as time varying parameter techniques
such as the Legendre polynomial model and a Bayesian change point model.
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The results showed that as expected, the effect of party support on
cabinet support declined under the Hosokawa government, which was the first
non-LDP coalition government in 38 years. While this tendency remained
under the Murayama coalition government, the partisan effect returned just
after Hashimoto, the LDP leader, assumed the prime minister’s seat. The
Bayesian change point analysis also suggested that any change in the political
psychology of Japanese citizens to support the cabinet happened in the early
1990s.
In Chapter 5, I tested two hypotheses to explain this change in the
effect of party support on cabinet support in the 1990s, using panel data from
the Japan Election Study II (JESII) , 1993-1996. I proposed two models, one
static and one dynamic. The results suggested that the effect of party support
on cabinet support dropped under the Murayama administration because the
supporters of the LDP, to which the prime minister did not belong, supported
the Murayama cabinet less strongly. Although the supporters of the JSP
with which the prime minister was affiliated tended to support the cabinet,
their proportion within the body of all government party supporters was not
large. The results also implied that the effect returned under the Hashimoto
administration because the prime minister was the LDP party leader, and a
large body of LDP supporters strongly supported the cabinet.
Overall, my research implied that the effect of party support declined
gradually due to a long time change in political environment and citizens’
mind, and the emergence of new parties in the 1990s accelerated the decline,
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and finally lead to a new regime under which citizens think of politics dif-
ferently. Under the post-1993 regime, there was no one powerful variable to
explain cabinet support.
This naturally raised a question: what are the determinants of cabinet
support under the post-1955 party system? Party support is not a fundamental
political variable anymore. Rather, party support may be influenced by the
popularity of prime minister who is said to be “presidentialized” these days.
Appendix IV explores the question, but finds nothing interesting. Probably,
we are still in transition toward the new regime.
Finally, the theory developed in this dissertation can be extended to
other democratic countries. The model of cabinet support explains how the
strength of support for each party within a coalition relates to the effect of
party support on cabinet support. It implies that a party whose supporters
have low loyalty to their party may weaken the effect of party support on
cabinet support by joining the coalition. Also, my research empirically showed
that the supporters of a party within a coalition to which a prime minister does
not belong have weaker emotional attachment to the cabinet. These things
lead to a prediction that the more parties a coalition consists of, the weaker and
more unstable the effect of party support on cabinet support is. More generally,
the coalition may suffer unstable popularity due to the number of parties
joining it. This hypothesis is testable, and testing it for other parliamentary
democracies will be on a future research agenda.
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Appendix IV: An Analysis of Cabinet Support
under the Koizumi Administration
Jun’ichiro Koizumi was elected as the LDP leader in April 2001, promising
the public that he would “destroy the LDP.” As promised, he tried to abolish
the special interests that traditionally associated the LDP politicians with
their support base industries. The privatization of the postal office was his
long-cherished issue, and was strongly opposed by the LDP politicians who
had received support from the postal office-related workers and industries.
After the House of Councillors’ rejection of the privatization bill, he dissolved
the House of Representatives, expecting the public’s support for the bill in a
general election. In the election of September 2005, he harshly criticized his
former colleagues, and even sent challengers (called “assassins” by the mass
media) to their districts.
As this example indicates, he did not expect support for his adminis-
tration from the LDP’s traditional support base, nor did he rely on partisan
supporters who had been loyal to the LDP even during scandals. Rather,
he expected the general public to support him in keeping the legitimacy of
his government. In other words, he did not hesitate to oppose the old LDP
politicians and the party itself if necessary.
These strategies might have some rationality, given that partisanship
became even weaker especially after the 1990s. Although Koizumi’s style was
unique, it seems to represent the relationship between cabinet support and
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party support after the early 1990s. Given increasing trends in independent
voters and mass media’s focus on prime minister’s personality after the early
1990s, I expect that party support does not work as a base for cabinet support
in the 2000s, and that cabinet support, based on popularity of a prime minister
among citizens, has an impact on party support.
6.0.1 The VAR Model
As in the previous chapters, I start with analyzing data compiled by the Jiji
Press, using the VAR model, and then move to an analysis using the instanta-
neous model with ARFIMA. I study the period from May 2001 to September
2006, for a total of 65 monthly observations.
Variables included in the analysis are cabinet support, government party
support, Consumer Price Index (CPI), and unemployment rate. Government
party support rate is calculated by summing up support rates for all political
parties in government. CPI is the ratio of the consumer price index to that
of the year before. Unemployment rate is newly added in analysis as another
economic variable.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show cabinet support and government party
support over this period. Comparing the two time-series, it is obvious that
cabinet support is always higher than party support for this period.
Before examining the VAR model, I test stationarity of the time series.
Table 6.2 shows the results of the ADF test. The data-dependent general-
to-specific criterion is used to choose the optimum lag structure of the error
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Table 6.1 Summary Statistics for Political and Economic Variables, May 2001-
September 2006
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Cabinet Support 65 47.18 10.35 34.00 78.40
Gov. Party Support 65 28.05 3.52 22.60 36.90
CPI 65 100.4 0.47 99.70 101.8
Unemployment 65 4.86 0.49 4.00 5.80
Source: Jiji Public Opinion Polls, 2001-2006.
Figure 6.1 Party Support and Cabinet Popularity in Japan, 2001-2006
Source: Jiji Public Opinion Polls, 2001-2006.
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process of the Dickey-Fuller equation. Under this process, the specific order
is chosen out of the general order (I considered here 10 lags based on the
Schwert’s rule of thumb: m = Int{12(T/100) 14}) on the basis of the standard
t-tests of significance of the lag terms.
Table 6.2 Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for a Unit Root
Regression: ∆zt = α0 + α1t + α2zt−1 +
∑m
i=1 βi∆zt−i + ϵt
ADF Lag order(m)
Cabinet Support -3.184 5
Gov. Party Support -2.503 2
CPI -1.417 9
Unemployment -3.213 9
An asterisk indicates significance (rejection of the unit root null) at the 5 per
cent level.
The results suggest that all series are nonstationary. Therefore, I take
the first difference of them.
I determine lag lengths in a VAR empirically using methods based on
Simms (1980). Table 6.3 shows the process. The likelihood ratios(LR) are
calculated to test if there is a difference in log-likelihood between the pair of
different lag specifications (up to 10 lags). The first look at the results suggests
that appropriate lag length is 3, 5, or 9. Calculating the likelihood ratios for all
possible pairs of the candidates, I finally find that the appropriate lag length
is 5.
The results of Granger causality test appear in Table 6.4. Each cell
in the table represents an estimated equation. The p values associated with
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Table 6.3 Likelihood Ratio Tests for Lag Order
Pair for Comparison LR
Lag = 1 vs. Lag = 2 37.066*
Lag = 2 vs. Lag = 3 33.793*
Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 4 17.656
Lag = 4 vs. Lag = 5 35.267*
Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 6 19.776
Lag = 6 vs. Lag = 7 12.010
Lag = 7 vs. Lag = 8 19.353
Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 9 24.240*
Lag = 9 vs. Lag = 10 18.079
Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 5 51.452*
Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 9 97.100
Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 9 64.358
An asterisk indicates significance (rejection of no difference) at the
5 percent level.
LR = (T − k)(log|DR| − log|DU |) ∼ χ2(q), where DR is the matrix
of cross products of residuals when the model is restricted; DU is the
same matrix for the unrestricted model; k is the total number of regression
coefficients estimated divided by the number of equations; q is the number of
restrictions.
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each equation appear in the cells of the table. Surprisingly, cabinet support
and party support do not Granger cause each other. p-value associated with
the effect of cabinet support on party support is, however, smaller than one
associated with the reverse effect. Granger causality is found only between
CPI and unemployment rate.
Table 6.4 Direction of Granger Causality
Independent variable Cab. support Gov. party support CPI Unemp
Cab. support - .299 .266 .102
Gov party sup .816 - .134 .950
CPI .358 .398 - .000
Unemp .124 .091 .024 -
Note. Each variable was lagged 5 months. OLS estimates.
The numbers are block F-test p-values.
Figure 3.3.1 shows the impulse response functions along with asymptotic
standard errors. Although it dies down soon, the effect of party support on
cabinet support is observed.
6.1 Instantaneous Model
6.1.1 ARFIMA Filter
I use the ARFIMA (AutoRegressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average)
model to analyze the instantaneous model. By ARFIMA modeling, I remove
the self-explanatory part of the series.
I estimate ARFIMA(p, d, q) using the modified profile likelihood (MPL).
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Figure 6.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model
Cabinet support → government party support
Cabinet support → CPI
Cabinet support → unemployment
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Figure 6.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model(continued)
Government party support → cabinet support
Government party support → CPI
Government party support → unemployment
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Figure 6.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model(continued)
CPI → cabinet support
CPI → government party support
CPI → unemployment
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Figure 6.2 Impulse response function from the VAR model(continued)
Unemployment → cabinet support
Unemployment → government party support
Unemployment → CPI
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Table 6.5 presents the estimates of the univariate models. The ARFIMA model
estimate is (0, d, 0) with d = .936 for cabinet support, (1, d, 0) with d = 1.025
for government party support, (0, d, 0) with d = .861 for CPI, and (0, d, 0) with
d = .771 for unemployment rate.1 All time-series are nonstationary, which is
consistent with the results of the ADF test.
Table 6.5 ARFIMA Model Estimates and t-ratios
d (s.e.) t-ratio for d = 0 t-ratio for d = 1 ARMA (p, q)
Cabinet support .936 8.636 -.589 (0, 0)
(.108)
Gov. party sup 1.025 6.023 .146 (1, 0)
(.170)
CPI .861 7.088 -1.149 (0, 0)
(.121)
Unemployment .771 7.838 -2.33 (0, 0)
(.098)
The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC)was used to select the best model
from ARFIMA(0, d, 0) to ARFIMA(4, d, 4).
I transform the time series into the white noise residuals of their respec-
tive ARFIMA models to purge autocorrelation and ensure stationarity before
examining the relationship among the series, then run an OLS regression for
the multivariate model of cabinet support.
1I use OX to estimate d. OX is part of the PcGive 9.0 package and is available from
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik/index.html I start from levels and estimate
all (p, d, q) models from (0, d, 0) to (4, d, 4) so that there are up to four AR and four MA
components. In the OX routine, stationarity with d ∈ (−5, 0.4999] is required for all time
series. Therefore if d is very close to the upper bound, I need to take the first difference so
that d−1 ∈ (−5, 0.4999]. In this case, because the estimate is not d but d−1, I need to add
1 to the estimate to obtain d. I estimate d by taking the first difference of all time series.
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In addition to these time-series variables, I include some event dummy
variables, which are considered important in explaining cabinet support un-
der the Koizumi administration. The dummies account for honeymoon, four
national elections (the House of Representatives elections in 2003 and 2005,
and the House of Councillors elections in 2001 and 2004), Koizumi’s visit to
the Yasukuni shrine, the resignation of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Makiko
Tanaka, Koizumi’s visit to North Korea, and the special legislation to send
troops to Iraq. Descriptions for each event dummy are as follows.
Yasukuni: Prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which worships
Japanese soldiers dieing in wars including WWII leaders, has been con-
troversial since Takeo Miki’s visit in the early 1980s because of negative
reactions from East Asian countries, such as China and Korea. Koizumi
promised to visit the shrine in the LDP’s party leader election, and ac-
complished his promise in August 2001. I expect this event to have a
negative impact on cabinet support.
Tanaka: Makiko Tanaka, a daughter of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka,
was popular among citizens, and helped Koizumi to win the party leader
election. Koizumi rewarded her by appointing her to Minister of Foreign
Affairs, but lost trust in her for her handling the ministry administra-
tion. Tanaka finally resigned in February 2002. I expect this event to
influence cabinet support negatively.
North Korea: In September 2002, Koizumi visited Kim Jong-Il in North Ko-
140
rea, and urged him to admit that North Korea had kidnapped Japanese
citizens for over twenty years. I expect this event to be positively influ-
ential on cabinet support.
Iraq: Upon a request from the U.S. President George W. Bush, Koizumi
hoped to send the Self Defense Force to help American troops in Iraq,
though Article 9 of Japanese Constitution is interpreted to prohibit him
to do so. A bill for special legislation was passed to allow the Japanese
troops to support Americans in non-combat situations in July 2003. I
expect this event to have a negative impact on cabinet support
Table 6.6 shows the result. I find that government party support, hon-
eymoon, elections in 2001 and 2003, Yasukuni, Tanaka, and North Korea have
statistically significant effects on cabinet support. Cabinet support increases
as government party support grows, and it benefits from people’s favorable
expectations for the new cabinet and Koizumi’s visit to North Korea, while
cabinet support dropped due to the elections of 2001 and 2003, Koizumi’s visit
to the Yasukuni shrine, and the resignation of Tanaka. Only election dummy
that has a positive impact on cabinet support is the House of Representatives
election of 2005, in which Koizumi asked people to support for his privatization
bill, although it is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The results from the VAR and instantaneous models provide only weak
evidence that the relationship between cabinet support and party support had
a unique characteristic under the Koizumi administration. The VAR model
suggests that the influence of cabinet support on party support is stronger than
141
Table 6.6 OLS Estimates of the Equation for Cabinet Support
Dependent variable: Cabinet support
Independent variables Estimate p-value
Constant -.04 .92













Adj − R2 .584
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the reverse effect, but neither effect was statistically significant. In addition,
the instantaneous model shows that party support has a statistically significant
impact on cabinet support under the Koizumi administration as well as for
other periods before Koizumi.
Such continuity in voters’ psychology has also been confirmed in some
analyses of the general elections of 2005. After the election, it was frequently
said that Koizumi was successful in getting support from less sophisticated
and educated independent voters by appealing them through the mass media.
Yamada (2006) denies these commonsensical “populist” explanations, arguing
that the amount of political information and media exposure did not mat-
ter. Shinada (2006) claims that Koizumi still relied on the LDP’s traditional
partisan voters, although admitting that he was popular among independent
voters. Mori (2006) is also skeptical about the possibility that Koizumi caused
a realignment of party support base.
Nevertheless, some symptoms of change are noticeable. First, the prime
minister’s personality seems to become more influential. The events related to
the prime minister’s initiative, such as his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and
North Korea, have significant impact on his own cabinet popularity. Moreover,
Koizumi’s claim for the privatization of the postal office was powerful enough
to make the effect of election dummy reversed from negative to positive in the
general election of 2005.
Second, the effect of cabinet support on party support becomes stronger
than the reverse, as seen in the VAR analysis result. Although both of these
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effects are still statistically insignificant, they may be in transition to a cabinet
support-lead relationship.
Third, in opposition to the trends suggested above, partisanship may be
growing especially among Democratic supporters. The analysis in Chapter 5
shows that partisanship matters for the NFP voters in evaluating the cabinet’s
performance, while it does not for other new party supporters. The NFP
and other new parties are different in their duration. The Democratic Party
has already existed long enough to have voters psychologically attached to
the party. This could be also caused by a consolidation of single member
districts in House of Representatives elections, which have been used since
1996. The DP candidate may be considered as an realistic alternative to the
LDP candidate in each district.
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